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A LEGAL HISTORY OF EXPENSE BUDGETING
IN NEW YORK CITY
Archibald F. Robertson, Jr.* and Lucian A. Vecchio**
I. Introductiont
An examination of the history of budget-making in the City of
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. L.L.B., New York
University School of Law. Former Thomas Jefferson Fellow in Political Theory at the Univer-
sity of Virginia and Budget Director of the Human Resources Administration of the City of
New York (1966-72).
** J.D., Fordham University School of Law. Instructor in urban law at the New School
for Social Research and a financial consultant.
t The various Charters of the City of New York will be cited in abbreviated form using
the popular name of the particular Charter. The full citation for each Charter is provided
below.
Charter Citation
1830 Charter Law of April 7, 1830, ch. 122, [1830] N.Y. Laws
125.
1849 Charter Law of April 2, 1849, ch. 187,[1849] N.Y. Laws
278.
1853 Charter Law of April 12, 1853, ch. 217, [1853] N.Y. Laws
410.
1857 Charter Law of April 14, 1857, ch. 446,[1857] N.Y. Laws
874.
1870 Charter Law of April 5, 1870, ch. 232, [1870] N.Y. Laws
520.
1873 Charter Law of April 30, 1873, ch. 335,[1873] N.Y. Laws
484.
The Greater New York Charter Law of May 4, 1897, ch. 378, [1897] N.Y. Laws
649.
Charter Amendatory Act of 1901 Law of April 22, 1901, ch. 466,[1901] N.Y. Laws
1184.
1938 Charter Law of Dec. 30, 1937, ch. 929, [1937] N.Y. Laws
1 (Extraordinary Sess.).
1963 Charter NEw YORK, N.Y., CITY CHARTER (1972) (When dis-
cussing amendments to the 1963 Charter, approved
by referendum of Nov. 4, 1975, the citation will be
as follows: 1963 Charter, as amended, (1975). The
effective date of such amendments is, generally,
Jan. 1, 1977. Id. § 1152a.).
All of the Charters prior to The Greater New York Charter were amendments to Law of
April 9, 1813, 2 Rev. Laws ch. LXXXVI, at 342 (1813), which was an attempt to codify the
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New York' will show that the City has never operated from a sound,
comprehensive budget system.
That does not mean that the City has proceeded irresponsibly, or
without regulation. Statutes to control the budget have existed in
New York City since at least the beginning of the nation itself.2 And,
most commendably, those very first statutes show a proper concern
by the City for the needs of all its citizens.3
The difficulty has been, rather, the lack of a comprehensively
drafted body of law to handle, as an integrated whole, all aspects
of City budgeting. Consequently, it has always been possible to
defeat, at least to some extent, some budgetary controls. This prob-
lem still exists today.
The purpose of this Article, then, is to examine in detail the
history of the budget process in order to determine the extent to
which the enacting of a budget by the City legislature is, in effect,
illusory, and, in so doing, to assemble in one place the current legal
scattered laws relating to the City of New York. A. MACMAHON, THE STATUTORY SOURCES OF
NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT 4-6 (1923). Codification was not attempted again until the
Consolidation Act of 1882, ch. 410, [1882] N.Y. Laws 1.
Technically speaking prior to 1882, only the 1857, 1870, and 1873 Charters were Charters
in the "true" sense. MACMAHON, supra at 7. However, all of the Charters mentioned were
"substantively" complete and, therefore, they have commonly been called "Charters."
1. For a general description of New York City's budget-making procedure see CITY OF NEW
YORK, BtREu OF MUNICIPAL INVESTIGATION AND STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, BUDGET
PROCEDURE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1915) [hereinafter cited as 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE].
The authors are indebted to Mr. Karl Schneider, student, Fordham University School of
Law, for uncovering this and many other arcane sources cited in this Article.
2. See, e.g., Law of April 26, 1784, ch. 43, [1777-841 N.Y. Laws 669.
3. E.g., id. provided in pertinent part:
That the mayor, recorder and aldermen of the city and county of New York for the
time being, or the major part of them, whereof the mayor or recorder to be one, be
and hereby are fully empowered and authorized, to order . . . the raising a sum . . .
by a tax on the estates, real and personal of all and every the freeholders and inhabit-
ants within the city and county of New York to be applied to the support and mainte-
nance of the poor of and to the repairing and maintaining the public roads within the
said city and county . ...
And it is hereby further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the said mayor recorder
and aldermen . . . to determine what proportion of the monies to be raised by virtue
of this act for the roads, and the poor shall be applied to the seperate [sic] use of the
poor . ...
The budget request of the Common Council to the State Legislature to defray the contingen-
cies of the City for 1786 totalled just over £10308, of which £4800 was for the Poor House. 1
MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1784-1831, item 386 at 198 (1917).
1975] EXPENSE BUDGETING
materials relating to the appropriations side' of the New York City
expense budget.5
II. Early History
A. Statutes and Cases
Prior to 1830, the City of New York had no budget system what-
soever in advance of expenditure; the City casually incurred debt
as the need to make expenditures arose, then collected the money
necessary to pay the bills as they fell due.' This nonmanagement
caused the City Convention of 1829' to incorporate the following
provision in the 1830 Charter:'
Annual and occasional appropriations shall be made by proper ordinances
of the common council, for every branch and object of city expenditure; nor
shall any money be drawn from the city treasury, except the same shall have
been previously appropriated to the purpose for which it is drawn.
Pursuant to this Charter requirement, the Common Council,
which consisted of a Board of Aldermen and a Board of Assistant
Aldermen,' passed a rudimentary budget ordinance. 10 Under this
ordinance, the heads of the city agencies were required to furnish
the Comptroller "a detailed statement . . . of the sum which will
be required for each distinct object of expenditure."" The Comp-
troller was then to present to the Common Council in December of
4. The "appropriations side" refers only to budgeted expenditures, not to revenue-raising
which is a separate subject outside the scope of this Article.
5. New York City's annual capital requirements are financed exclusively through borrow-
ing, but the annual debt service charges (interest plus principal amortization) are part of each
annual expense budget. The capital budget is outside the scope of this Article.
6. See 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 3. Beginning in 1830 the Comptroller
prepared the City's budget; before that time the Treasurer performed the same task. T.
SMITH, GUIDE TO THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 68 (10th ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as N.Y.C. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT].
7. 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 3.
8. 1830 Charter § 18. The 1849 amendments to the 1830 Charter virtually repeated this
section. See 1849 Charter § 7 which provided:
No money shall be drawn from the city treasury except the same shall have been
previously appropriated to the purpose for which it is drawn; and all appropriations
shall be based upon specific and detailed statements in writing of the several heads of
departments through the comptroller.
9. 1830 Charter § 1.
10. NEW YORK, N.Y., REV. LAWS & ORDINANCES ch. VII, §§ 2-6 (1934).
11. Id. § 3.
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each year a general City budget for the next year, together with an
estimate of miscellaneous revenues, and of the additional amount
needed to balance the budget.'" This "balancing amount" was the
amount that needed to be raised by levying taxation-which be-
came known as the "tax levy" funding of the City's budget.'3 During
this period the City's tax levy rate in support of its budget was itself
fixed annually by special act of the State Legislature.' 4
One observation should be made: from this first rudimentary or-
dinance, the City legislature began a history of never being directly
in charge of the budget. In fact, the budget has always been man-
aged by an executive oligarchy-a few executives whose expertise
with (and subsequent mystification of)'5 the budget process enabled
them to acquire an unchecked control over discretionary expendi-
ture decisions. The City legislature, by its own actions or by those
of the State, has been precluded from any meaningful input con-
cerning the budget, functioning instead as a rubber stamp for the
proposals of the particular executive group managing the budget.'I
Beginning in 1851,' 7 the State Legislature incorporated, in the
annual statute establishing the City's tax levy rate for annual ap-
propriations, the items for which the tax levy was imposed'8 and, in
1853, began limiting the use of such tax levy income to those partic-
ular items only, thereby preventing transfers of budget appropria-
tions.'" This was still a lump-sum budget as opposed to a line-by-
line budget, but certain general categories were established for
spending which the City could not circumvent. 2
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Cox v. Mayor of New York, 103 N.Y. 519, 525, 9 N.E. 48, 51 (1886).
14. Id. See, e.g., Law of March 23, 1850, ch. 84, [1850] N.Y. Laws 123; Law of April 26,
1784, ch. 43, [1777-84] N.Y. Laws 669.
15. See note 102 infra.
16. F. SHAW, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY LEGISLATURE 18-19 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as HISTORY OF THE N.Y.C. LEGISLATURE]. Section seven of the 1849 Charter had at-
tempted a measure of budget control.
17. 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE 4.
18. Law of June 20, 1851, ch. 258, § 1, [1851] N.Y. Laws 482.
19. Law of April 15, 1853, ch. 232, § 2 [1853] N.Y. Laws 522. The 1853 Charter dealt
with the budget in a minor way. Section four of the 1853 Charter provided:
Every act, resolution or ordinance, appropriating money or involving the expenditure
of money not rendered imperative under the provisions of any state law, shall originate
in the board of councilmen; but the board of aldermen may propose or concur with
amendments, as in other cases.
20. Section two of the 1853 Charter provided:
[Vol. IV
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However, the provision in the 1830 Charter for "occasional appro-
priations"" was construed in practice to mean that additional ap-
propriations might be made for any purpose." Therefore, the bal-
ance and control attempted in 1853 by the tax levy rule 3 was un-
done, and the City was required to borrow in order to support
"budget modifications"" made under the "occasional appropria-
tions" clause. It was not until 1856 that this practice of making such
"occasional appropriations" beyond that authorized by the tax levy
income was stopped. 5
In 1856, the State Legislature began making substantial changes
in the New York City budget submitted by the Common Council."
In fact, from 1856 to 1870 the State Legislature increasingly limited
the City's discretionary powers concerning budget appropriations
until it had absorbed virtually all of the City's discretionary budget
power." This was a reaction, in large measure, to the corruption and
irresponsibility prevalent in the downstate municipal govern-
ments. 21
No portion of the said respective sums, hereinbefore [§ 1] named, shall be expended
or applied to any other purposes or objects than said objects and purposes respectively
for which the board of supervisors of said city and county of New-York are hereinbefore
empowered to raise the same as aforesaid.
During this period the budget appropriations were made in lump sum form and thus
required reappropriation by the Common Council for payment to specific payees. Both pro-
cesses are referred to by the word "appropriation." The State Legislature's usage of the term
usually refers to an allocation's general purpose and to the authorization to raise the necessary
funds by taxation; the Common Council's usage refers to the designation of the State-
authorized allocations for specific payees or contractors.
21. 1830 Charter § 18.
22. See 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
23. See, e.g., Law of April 3, 1855, ch. 141, § 1, [1855] N.Y. Laws 221.
24. See text accompanying notes 149-64 infra.
25. See 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 4.
26. Compare Law of April 7, 1849, ch. 276, § 1, [1849] N.Y. Laws 402 with Law of April
12, 1856, ch. 176, § 1, [1856] N.Y. Laws 271.
27. Compare Law of April 7, 1849, ch. 276, § 1, [1849] N.Y. Laws 402 with Law of April
12, 1856, ch. 176, § 1, [1856] N.Y. Laws 271 and Law of April 26, 1870, ch. 383, [1870] N.Y.
Laws 881 (repealed 1881). The budget provided in the Law of April 26, 1870 was eleven pages
in length whereas the budgets in the Laws of April 7, 1849 and April 12, 1856 were only one
and three pages in length, respectively.
During this period two additional charters were enacted-that of 1857 and that of 1870.
Both dealt with budgeting in a minor manner 1857 Charter § 31; 1870 Charter §§ 18, 101.
28. "With the bestowal of the first trolley franchise in 1851 the Board of Aldermen em-
barked on a career of spoliation. The body in which 'Boss' Tweed served his apprenticeship
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But, in 1867,29 action had been taken which would ultimately
cause the State to relinquish its ever-tightening direct control over
the details of the City budget.30 In that year, section 10 of the State
appropriation statute for New York City established what was, in
effect, an embryonic budget board whose function it was to screen
the estimate-requests which would go to the Common Council."
The board consisted of the Mayor, the Comptroller, and the chief
officer of the agency concerned. 2 After the board passed its recom-
mendation on to the Common Council, the Council was required to
act on the estimate; or, in any event, the Mayor was then to send it
on to the State Legislature within three weeks.3" This overlapping
policy had the effect of gradually distancing the State Legislature
from the details of the City budget.34
Finally, in 1871, the State appropriations statute for New York
the following year was known as the 'Forty Thieves.' It was said that an enterprising alderman
could make his fortune in a single term; few were backward in this pursuit of pelf." HISTORY
OF THE N.Y.C. LEGISLATURE, supra note 16, at 4.
29. Cf. Act of April 25, 1864, ch. 403, § 60 [1864] N.Y. Laws 930 (repealed 1881) which
established a "Board of Estimate and Apportionment" to apportion certain costs of the
Metropolitan Police District consisting of the counties of New York, Kings, Westchester,
and Richmond, and the towns of Newtown, Flushing, and Jamaica in Queens County. The
Metropolitan Police District was established by Law of April 15, 1857, ch. 569, [1857] N.Y.
Laws 200.
N.Y.C. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 6, at 29 traces the origin of the Board
of Estimate and Apportionment to the 1853 Charter. Section sixteen of the 1853 Charter
provided in pertinent part:
All ordinary appropriations made for the support and government of the alms-house
department shall, before the same are finally made, be submitted by the governors of
the alms-house to a board of commissioners, consisting of the mayor, recorder, comp-
troller, the president of the board of aldermen, and the president of the board of
councilmen.
30. Law of April 23, 1867, ch. 586, [1867] N.Y. Laws 1596 (repealed in part 1881).
31. Id. § 10 provided:
Hereafter all estimates for the anticipated annual expenditures of all boards and
departments of the government of the city of New York shall be made by the chief
officers of every such board and department, in connection with the mayor and comp-
troller of said city [of New York] and submitted to the common council of said city,
at the first meeting thereof in January of each year; and said estimates, whether acted
upon or not by said common council, shall be presented by the said mayor to the
legislature of this State within three weeks from the time of being so submitted to the
said common council, and said estimates shall be taken to be the sole official estimates




34. See Law of April 19, 1871, ch. 583, § 3, [1871] N.Y. Laws 1269.
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City empowered the Board of Supervisors35 (for New York County)
directly to establish the tax levy rate necessary to finance New York
City's "budget," i.e., the total of all the estimates as finally deter-
mined by the newly-created "board of apportionment,"3 the only
limitation being an aggregate limit of two per cent of the total
valuation of taxable property or $25 million, whichever was less."
This procedure (and with it the Board of "Estimate 'and Appor-
tionment")" was made permanent in 1873, when the State Legis-
lature adopted a Charter for the City of New York, section 112 of
35. Board of Supervisors refers to the governing body of a county, in this instance New
York County qua county, established by Law of Nov. 1, 1683, ch. 4, [1664-1719] N.Y.
Colonial Laws 121. The Board of Supervisors starts, as a governing body, with the "Commis-
sioners. . . thatt shall bee appointed in every Citty, Towne and County within this Province
ffor the Superviseing the publique affairs & charge of each respective City Towne & County
aforesaid." Id. ch. 9. The creation of the modem twelve-member Board of Supervisors was
by Law of April 15, 1857, ch. 590 [1857] N.Y. Laws 285, as amended, Law of April 17, 1858,
ch. 321, [1858] N.Y. Laws 515, and was abolished by Law of April 30, 1874, ch. 304, §§ 1, 3,
[1874] N.Y. Laws 360. E. DURAND, THE FINANCES OF NEW YORK CrrY 77-78 [hereinafter cited
as N.Y.C. FINANCES].
36. Law of April 19, 1871, ch. 583, § 3, [1871] N.Y. Laws 1269 provided in part:
The mayor of the city of New York, the comptroller of the city of New York, the
commissioner of public works, the president of the department of public parks, shall
meet as a board of apportionment, and after fixing the . . .[taxes] to be raised...
and after setting apart so much of said sum to be raised by tax . . . under this act as
may be necessary for the payment of the interest on bonds and stocks of said city and
county, . . . and for the payment of so much of the principal of said bonds and stocks
as may become due and payable from taxation within .. .[1871], and also so much
as may be necessary to pay the proportion of the State tax to be paid by the city and
county of New York in . . . [1871], shall apportion the remainder thereof among and
set apart to the various departments and purposes of the city and county governments
by the concurring voters of all the members of said board present. ...
37. Id. § 1. This legislation became known as "the two per cent act." See, e.g., Quinn v.
Mayor of the City of New York, 63 Barb. 595, 601-02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 53 N.Y. 627
(1873). This requirement was eliminated by Law of June 13, 1873, ch. 758, § 1, [1873] N.Y.
Laws 1127 and no limit imposed until 1884 when the N.Y. CONST. art. VnI (1846) was
amended by adding section eleven which limited the indebtedness of any city of over 100,000
to not exceeding ten percent of the assessed value of real estate subject to taxation and
restored the two percent limitation which was continued in the N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 10(b)
(1938) as to any city of 125,000 or more, until amended in 1964, by N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 10(f),
raising the limitation to two and one-half percent for the City of New York.
38. 1873 Charter § 112 which provided in pertinent part: "The mayor, comptroller, presi-
dent of the board of aldermen, and the president of the department of taxes and assessments,
shall constitute a board of estimate and apportionment ....
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which provided the procedure for the adoption of a City budget.39
Henceforth, appropriations were to be determined as follows: the
gross amount of the proposed budget appropriations would be fixed
by unanimous vote of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment,
and the detailed amounts fixed by majority vote. 4° The proposed
budget appropriations, together with explanations in detail for each
estimate, would then be submitted to the Common Council, Am whose
only control over the proposals would be the power to make an
objection.4" And at that, the objections were only advisory and not
at all binding upon the Board.43 The Board was required merely to
publish in the City Record" its reasons for rejecting such objec-
tions.4" Having heard and dispatched the Council's objections, the
Board was then free to approve and adopt the final budget in gross
by unanimous vote.4"
39. Id. After establishing the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, this Act provided
that:
[Such board] shall, annually . . . make a provisional estimate of the amounts re-
quired to pay the expenses of conducting the public business of the city and county of
New York, in each department and branch thereof, for the then next ensuing financial
year.
Id.
This Act, after providing for certain mandatory charges against the budget, and interest
and principal due on municipal bonds for the next year, and the State tax for the next year
further provided:
Such provisional estimate shall be prepared in such detail as to the aggregate sum
allowed to each department and bureau as the said board of apportionment shall deem
advisable. For the purpose of making said provisional estimate, the heads of depart-
ments shall, at least thirty days before the said provisional estimate is required to be
made as herein provided, send to the board of apportionment an estimate in writing,
herein called a departmental estimate, of the amount of expenditure, specifying in
detail the objects thereof, required in their respective departments, including a state-
ment of each of the salaries of their officers, clerks, employees and subordinates. The
same statement as to salaries and expenditure shall be made by all other officers,
persons and boards having power to fix or authorize them.
Id.
40. Id.
41. Section two of this Act provided for a bicameral City Legislature consisting of the
"Board of Aldermen" and the "Assistant Aldermen." The latter body was abolished on
January 1, 1875. Id. § 2. The surviving "house" continued with the legal name of "Common
Council" until it was changed to the "Board of Aldermen" in the New York Consolidation
Act of 1882, ch. 410, § 29, [1882] N.Y. Laws 7. But see note 48 infra.
42. 1873 Charter § 112.
43. Id.
44. The City Record, printed regularly since 1872, is the official newspaper of New York
City. N.Y.C. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 6, at 145.
45. 1873 Charter § 112.
46. Id. The Law of June 14, 1873, ch. 779, § 2, [1873] N.Y. Laws 1186 (repealed 1881)
1975] EXPENSE BUDGETING
Also, the State Legislature, in 1873, omitted the "two per cent"
limit,4" and the Board of Supervisors was now fully empowered
(more precisely, required) to establish the tax levy rate necessary to
finance the budget.48 This provision was the cause of a challenge to
the (State) constitutionality of the Act in Townsend v. Mayor,4" a
taxpayer suit.
The court, in an indefensible decision,'" found the statute consti-
provided for a no-financial-ceiling revision by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment of
the New York City budgets for 1871 and 1872 which were authorized by Law of April 19, 1871,
ch. 583, § 2, [1871] N.Y. Laws 1269 (repealed 1873), for funds spent prior to July 1, 1873.
This provision was enforced in People ex rel. McGowan v. Havemeyer, 1 Hun 61 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1874) thereby compelling budget finality for the New York City budgets for 1871 and 1872
as of the commencement of July 1, 1873.
47. See note 37 supra.
48. Section 112 of the 1873 Charter provided in pertinent part:
The aggregate amount so estimated shall be certified by the comptroller to the supervi-
sors of the county of New York; and it shall be the duty of said supervisors and they
are hereby empowered and directed annually to cause to be raised, according to law,
and collected by tax upon the estates, real and personal, subject to taxation within
the city and county of New York, the said amounts so estimated and certified as
aforesaid.
See also Law of June 14, 1873, ch. 779, § 2, [1873] N.Y. Laws 1186 (repealed 1881). In 1874,
New York County was merged into the City of New York and the powers and duties of the
Board of Supervisors were conferred upon the Board of Aldermen. Law of April 30, 1874, ch.
304, §§ 1, 3, [1874] N.Y. Laws 360.
49. 16 Hun 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878), aff'd, 77 N.Y. 542 (1879).
50. In Townsend, the supreme court at general term adopted the poorly-reasoned opinion
of special term which held the statute not violative of the State Constitution. The issue was,
the court said, "whether the Legislature had the power to create a board of estimate and
apportionment, for the purpose of ascertaining the amounts which should be raised by the
board of supervisors for the expenses of the city and county of New York." 16 Hun at 363.
The court relied on Town of Guilford v. Board of Supervisors, 13 N.Y. 143, 145-46 (1855) in
deeming taxation a legislative power, and concluded that "[tihe Legislature, therefore, had
the power to provide that the board of estimate and apportionment shall determine the
amount which should be raised for municipal purposes .... " 16 Hun at 364.
To further make authoritative its reliance upon Guilford, the court detailed the facts
presented in that case and concluded that "[t]he analogy ... seems to be entirely perfect
. 16 Hun at 367. Nothing could have been more grossly inaccurate.
In Guilford, the former commissioners of highways had exhausted all possible legal reme-
dies in an attempt to obtain reimbursement from the Town of Guilford for services performed
by them on its behalf. Having no legal remedy, they managed to procure an act by the
Legislature which would provide equitable relief. The act required the court to appoint three
commissioners to determine the amount due to the petitioners, and compelled the Board of
Supervisors to levy the amount so determined and pay it over to the petitioners. The town
brought suit to have the act declared unconstitutional. The court found, inter alia, that the
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tutional: it held the Legislature could, in effect, made a de facto
delegation of its taxing power-heretofore an exclusively legislative
function-to a local budget-managing executive group (the Board
of Estimate and Apportionment)." Thus, the executive oligarchy
was established as a legitimate institution, sui generis to municipal
jurisprudence;5" the executive budget-managing group is the only
transfer to the court-appointed commissioners of, in effect, a tax-determining (and therefore
legislative) power was not violative of the State Constitution. 13 N.Y. at 148-49. The court
in Townsend reasoned that the court-appointed commissioners in Guilford were analogous
to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment and, on that basis, the Board's powers were
constitutional. 16 Hun at 367-68. This reasoning is preposterous. Guilford dealt with an act
which was in the nature of a private bill for equitable relief, being sui generis and thereby
outside the general law. Furthermore, People ex rel. Hopkins v. Board of Supervisors, 52 N.Y.
556 (1873), which should have been controlling, was erroneously distinguished in Townsend
as inapposite. 16 Hun at 368.
The Hopkins court held that a statute (Law of May 15, 1872, ch. 734, § 1, [18721 N.Y.
Laws 1780) imposing a "[t]ax of three and a half mills per dollar, or so much thereof as may
be necessary" was sufficiently vague so as to leave to the discretion of administrative officers
of the State the determination of exactly how much should be taxed, thereby delegating de
facto taxing authority, a legislative function, to members of the executive department,
another Department of State. 52 N.Y. at 567. The court held that this delegation was uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 570.
It was stated in Townsend that Hopkins did "not decide that the Legislature cannot
delegate the power to levy a local tax for a local purpose." 16 Hun at 368. On that basis, the
Townsend Court distinguished Hopkins. Id. While this statement may be correct, it is none-
theless unresponsive, in that the legal issue is not whether the Legislature can delegate a
legislative power to a local government, but whether the Legislature can delegate a legislative
power to an executive group-regardless of whether the group is state or local. The court, in
Townsend, finessed the problem of the de facto delegation of legislative power to an executive
group, a delegation clearly violative of article eight of the State Constitution as determined
in Hopkins. See 52 N.Y. at 567-68.
It should be noted that Guilford was overruled in 1875 by the adoption of two amendments
to the N.Y. CONST. art. 8 (1846). One amendment provided "(Tihe Legislature shall not,
nor shall the common council of any city, nor any board of supervisors, grant any extra
compensation to any public officer, servant, agent or contractor." Id. § 28. The other amend-
ment provided: "[nlo county, city, town or village shall hereafter give any money or prop-
erty, or loan its money or credit to or in aid of any individual association, or corporation
. '." Id. § 10; see Mahon v. Board of Educ., 171 N.Y. 263, 266, 63 N.E. 1107, 1109 (1902).
51. 16 Hun at 364. Note that Charter Amendatory Act of 1901 § 383 provides that the
appointee of a borough president member of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment may
properly sit as a Board member in his appointing senior's absence. Richmond Ry. v. Gilchrist,
225 App. Div. 371, 233 N.Y.S. 184 (1st Dep't 1929).
52. One commentator has observed that "[in no other city, except the few which have
followed the example of the metropolis, does a small board of executive officers have the final
appropriating power." N.Y.C. FINANCES, supra note 35, at 278.
Charles A. Beard noted that a striking feature of budgeting in New York City was:
the transference of budget making in the first instance from the nominal authority,
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governmental institution legitimately empowered to perform func-
tions relating to its purpose (i.e., taxing) which are normally per-
formed by another branch of government: in a phrase, the budget-
managing group became legitimized in its existence uniquely out-
side the system of checks and balances.5"
Budgeting proceeded generally in the fashion established in 1873
until the adoption of The Greater New York City Charter, in 1897,
when certain notable changes in budgeting technique were made.
Now, the Board of Estimate and Apportionment54 would be empow-
ered by § 237 of the Charter to "transfer any appropriation" within
the same fiscal year which a particular agency head found to be in
excess of the agency's needs for that year "to such other purposes
or objects for which the appropriations in such year are insufficient,
or such as may require the same." 5 The procedure for such a trans-
fer, known as a budget modification," required the particular
agency head to make a modification request to the Board of Esti-
mate and Apportionment.57 The Board would refer the request to an
examining bureau: generally, if the request involved appropriations
for personnel (personal service appropriations) the referral would
be to the Bureau of Standards; if the request involved appropria-
the board of estimate and apportionment, to a committee of the board, and from this
"main committee" to a subcommittee, composed not of members of the board, but of
their personal representatives, employes of the city, more or less expert in the infinite
details of the budget. We may say that the greater part of the New York City budget
is determined by necessity and that the details of that part are settled by adjustments
made by the staff agencies of the board of estimate and apportionment, the subcom-
mittee of that board, and the heads of departments. The little that is left for adjust-
ment after the subcommittee has completed its work is determined by the main
committee of the board. The board itself, which theoretically makes the budget, as a
formal organization merely delivers eulogies over a fait accompli.
Beard, Prefatory Note to A. LAHEE, THE NEW YORK CITY BUDGET vi (1917). Even the vote on
the budget may be by a member-appointed deputy. See Richmond Ry. v. Gilchrist, 225 App.
Div. 371, 233 N.Y.S. 184 (1st Dep't 1929). Such delegation is presently authorized by 1963
Charter §§ 7, 23.c., 82.1., 94.b.
53. "[TIhe real influence of the council in the appropriations has been infinitesimal."
N.Y.C. FINANCES, supra note 35, at 255.
54. In 1893 the "counsel to the corporation" was added to the Board of Estimate and
Apportionment. Law of March 9, 1893, ch. 106, § 1, [1893] N.Y. Laws 207. The position was
continued as a member under The Greater New York Charter § 226. For the remaining four
members of the Board, see note 38 supra.
55. The Greater New York Charter § 237.
56. The concept of "budget modification" is crucial to budget administration. See notes
149-64 infra and accompanying text.
57. 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 13.
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tions for nonpersonal items (other than personal services) the refer-
ral then would be to the Bureau of Contract Supervision." Guided
by the examining bureau's report, the Board would approve or deny
the modification. 9
The Charter also firmly established the line-by-line schedule, al-
beit only as to personal services, as a requirement in budget-
making.'" This was thought to be a major advance in budget con-
trol." However, as later discussion will show, the value of the line-
by-line device is that of audit check control, rather than the more
desirable budgetary "consequences" control. 2
The Charter also gave the Mayor the power to veto, on a per item
basis, 3 any reduction made by the new "Municipal Assembly,''64
whose only control over the budget was the power to reduce some
appropriations. 5 The veto was in practice irreversible: the Munici-
58. Id.
59. Id. See also Beard, supra note 52, at v, which notes that three organs of the Board of
Estimate and Apportionment, the Bureau of Contract Supervision, the Bureau of Personal
Service, and the Committee on Education were "really budget-making bureaus." As such
they were precursors of the City's Bureau of the Budget.
60. Section 226 of The Greater New York Charter provided:
In order to enable said board [Board of Estimate and Apportionment] to make such
budget, the heads of departments ...shall . ..send to the board of estimate and
apportionment an estimate in writing .. .specifying in detail the objects thereof,
required in their respective departments . ...
61. Beard, supra note 52, at iii, observed:
It is no disparagement of other American cities to say that New York has taken the
leadership in budget reform during the last ten years. Perhaps most students of munic-
ipal government would concede without question the proposition that no other city has
come so near to the ideal both as regards the form of the budget and the process of
making it. ...
62. It has been observed:
[Tihe form of the New York City budget classification by object shows that the nature
of central control is primarily of an accounting or auditing character. . . .Inasmuch
as such "control" could not be based upon complete information, however, it would
not be an intelligent control. . . .The New York City budget is primarily-and so
long as the functional grouping remains subordinate to the object classification will
remain-an instrument for voucher control.
LAHEE, supra note 52, at 92-93.
63. The Greater New York Charter § 226.
64. Section seventeen of The Greater New York Charter provided:
The legislative power . . . shall be vested in . . .the council and board of aldermen
to be together styled "The Municipal Assembly of The City of New York."
65. Section 226 of The Greater New York Charter provided:
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pal Assembly needed a five-sixths vote to override the veto. 6
This Charter, though, still did not supply the kind of audit check
control over the budget that was wanted. So, in 1901, the Charter
was amended67 to enable the Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment68 to set the "terms and conditions"" under which the City's
expense budget was to be executed. The effect of this provision was
to make the Board the budget "overseer," and thereby empowered
to monitor the administration of the expense budget. From 1901 to
1924, included among the detailed "terms and conditions" govern-
ing the execution of each year's budget were provisions detailing the
conditions upon which the Board would make modifications" based,
of course, upon the reports of the examining bureaus mentioned
above.7
As a consequence of the enabling provision of the 1901 Amend-
ment, the Board immediately began promulgating administrative
fiat (i.e., "terms and conditions") which seems to have been ex-
panded to the fullest extent by 1946.72 This rule-making power gave
The municipal assembly, by a majority vote by all the members elected thereto [not
a majority of those present and voting], may reduce the said several amounts fixed
by the board of estimate and apportionment, except [mandatory appropriations]...
but the municipal assembly may not increase such amounts nor insert any new items.
66. Id.
67. Charter Amendatory Act of 1901. This Act was the product of a State Charter Revision
Commission appointed in 1900 by Governor Theodore Roosevelt pursuant to Law of April 16,
1900, ch. 465, [1900] N.Y. Laws 1140.
68. The Board of Estimate and Apportionment, under section 226 of the Charter Amenda-
tory Act of 1901 consisted of the Mayor, Comptroller, President of the Board of Aldermen,
and Presidents of the Boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens, and Richmond. For
earlier compositions of the various boards of estimate, see notes 36, 38 supra.
69. Section 226 of the Charter Amendatory Act of 1901 provided:
Such budget shall be prepared in such detail as to the titles of appropriations, the
terms and conditions, not inconsistent with law, under which the same may be ex-
pended, the aggregate sum and the items thereof allowed to each department, bureau,
office, board or commission, as the said board of estimate and apportionment shall
deem advisable.
70. See text accompanying note 58 supra. The "terms and conditions" of the budget of
1924 provided for: (1) no modification of salary and wage codes except for appropriations of
departments involved in the establishment of a central motor repair shop; (2) the filling of
vacancies in municipal employment; (3) the rates at which vacancies in municipal employ-
ment were to be filled; (4) payroll administration; and (5) audit and inventory of OTPS items.
[19241 BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK.
71. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
72. See Terms and Conditions [1946-47] BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. The "terms
and conditions" of the 1963-64 budget provided:
The units of appropriation as finally adopted for the fiscal year July 1, 1963, to June
30, 1964, shall be administered under the appropriate provisions of the New York City
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the Board the opportunity to exercise much control over the admin-
istration of the budget. As a result, various court actons were
brought to determine whether the Board was exceeding this statu-
tory authority and invading the province of the Legislature.73
The 1901 Charter Amendment gave the Board of Estimate almost
complete de facto power over the budget" in order to achieve the
kind of audit check control that the State Legislature desired. This
worked an even greater exclusion of the City legislature from the
business of the budget. For example, the Board-votes themselves
were heavily those of executive officials.75 In addition, after the
Board of Estimate and Apportionment had considered the budget,
it was submitted to the now "Board of Aldermen,"76 whose power
was only to reduce some items (e.g., allocations "fixed by law" could
not be reduced by the Board of Aldermen)." The influence of the
Charter and the Administrative Code.
Terms and Conditions, [1963-64] BUDGET OF THE Crry OF NEW YORK. In 1937, the Administra-
tive Code of the City of New York was enacted. Law of December 30, 1937, ch. 929, [1939]
N.Y. Laws 1 (Extraordinary Session). The Administrative Code contains none of the "terms
and conditions," evidently because the Board of Estimate did not wish to inhibit its power
under section 123 of the 1938 Charter to set the "terms and conditions" "under which the
budget . . . shall be administered."
The present equivalent of the "terms and conditions" is now contained in mayoral execu-
tive orders. See, e.g., New York, N.Y. Exec. Order No. 20 (Aug. 1, 1974).
73. The proper context of these "terms and conditions" has been delineated in the follow-
ing cases: Rushford v. LaGuardia, 280 N.Y. 217, 20 N.E.2d 547 (1939) (the Board of Estimate
could, in the "terms and conditions," require a vacancy filling certificate from the Director
of the Budget and the Board could also delegate to the Director the power to fill a position
at a salary below that specified on the budget line involved); People ex rel. Plancon v.
Prendergast, 219 N.Y. 252, 114 N.E. 433 (1916) ("terms and conditions" may require the
obtaining of a filling certificate from the Board of Estimate and Apportionment before a
City position may be filled); Natilson v. Hodson, 264 App. Div. 384, 35 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st
Dep't 1942), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 842, 47 N.E.2d 442 (1943) ("terms and conditions" may not
properly be used to forbid employees from moonlighting).
74. The Charter Amendatory Act of 1901, was amended by Law of April 25, 1917, ch. 258,
§ 1, [1917] N.Y. Laws 939 to provide that the Board of Estimate and Apportionment shall
"prepare for public discussion a printed tentative budget" and ten days later a "budget
proposed for adoption," which "may not thereafter be increased in any item or contain any
new item. .. "
75. Although all eight members of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment were subject
to general election-three city-wide (the Mayor, President of the Board of Aldermen, and
Comptroller) and five to borough-wide elections (the President of each Borough)-only one,
the President of the Board of Aldermen, could, with any political accuracy, be described as
a legislator. Charter Amendatory Act of 1901, § 18 (President of the Board), § 94 (Mayor), §
226 (membership), § 382 (Borough Presidents). The voting was weighted. Id § 26.
76. Charter Amendatory Act of 1901 § 17.
77. Id. § 226.
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Board of Aldermen continued to be limited in that the Mayor could
veto a Board of Aldermen reduction and the Board of Aldermen
needed a three-fourths vote to override the veto.78 In fact, although
several attempts were made, the Board never once mustered the
necessary three-fourths vote.7"
B. Early Gimmickry-Unofficial Budget Modifications
From the beginning of formal budgeting, its management has
become increasingly the province of a few experts." This has been
the natural consequence of several interrelated factors: the inher-
ently technical nature of large-organization bookkeeping;' the
State's reasonable fear that fraud and mismanagement might occur
without extensive audit check systems, with significant control over
those systems vested in a few officials who could be held directly
accountable therefor; and the tendency of those in control to seek
more control.
78. Id.
79. HISTORY OF THE N.Y.C. LEGISLATURE, supra note 16, at 19. The role of the Board of
Aldermen in budget-making was pitifully small. Id. at 21. An alderman who had objected to
the Board's role stated:
The participation of the Board of Aldermen of this city in the making of the annual
budget is very much in the nature of a farce, and not even an amusing farce. . . . It
would be impossible to find anywhere else in the world a representative body nominally
vested with legislative authority on behalf of more than five millions of people, which,
in the first place has so little power over the public purse strings, or which, in the
second place, shows so little disposition to use the limited power that it has. . . .Even
within the narrow limits prescribed by the charter, the Board of Aldermen could
exercise a certain beneficial influence on the city government, if its members were less
inclined to save trouble for themselves by leaving all responsibility to the men higher
up.
Id., quoting IV PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF ALDERMEN 641-42 (1918).
80. It has been observed:
[The budget director] can and does make himself comparatively inaccessible to his
critics and holds himself aloof from those who court him. In this practice, he is aided
considerably by the close-knit character of his small staff, hand-picked by transfer
from other agencies or hand-raised within the Bureau [of the Budget] by advance-
ment from clerical ranks.
W. SAYRE & H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY 369 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
GOVERNING N.Y.C.].
It is interesting to note that the present Mayor of the City of New York, Abraham D.
Beame, was Assistant Budget Director from 1946-52, Budget Director from 1952-60, Comp-
troller of the City from 1961-65, and 1969-73. CITIZENS UNION, VOTERS DIRECTORY 13 (1973).
81. For an amusing discussion in the federal context, see A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 8-9 (1964) [hereinafter cited as POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS].
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This last point is demonstrated by the continuing attempts of the
budget managers"2 to control the salaries of all officials who appear
82. In this context "budget managers" refers to those persons who were empowered to set
salaries. This power was regulated by the following statutes from 1861 to 1963.
(1) Law of April 17, 1861, ch. 293, § 5 [1861] N.Y. Laws 671 provided:
No expenditure for salaries of officers in . . . [New York] city shall be made exceed-
ing the total amount herein provided for the same, nor shall the common council of
said city, during the ensuing year, increase or diminish the number or compensation
of the several offices of the city government as now established by law, ordinance or
resolution ...
(2) Law of April 25, 1867, ch. 806, § 2 [1867] N.Y. Laws 1996-97 provided:
[A]nd the board of supervisors of the county of New York are hereby prohibited from
creating any new office or department or increasing the salaries of those now in office
or their successors, except as provided by acts passed by the legislature of eighteen
hundred and sixty-seven.
(3) 1870 Charter, § 111 provided:
[T]he salaries of all officers provided for by this act . . . shall be prescribed by
ordinance or resolution to be passed by the common council ...
(4) Law of April 19, 1871, ch. 583, § 3 [1871] N.Y. Laws 1270 empowered the Board of
Apportionment to "regulate all salaries of officers and employees of the city and county
government."
(5) 1873 Charter § 97, 112 empowered the Board of Estimate and Apportionment to set
salaries "of all officers whose offices may be [lawfully] created by the common council."
(6) The Consolidation Act of 1882, ch. 410, §§ 97, 189, 202 [1882] N.Y. Laws 26, continued
this arrangement.
(7) The Greater New York City Charter § 56 provided:
The municipal assembly shall have power, upon the recommendation of the board of
estimate and apportionment, to fix the salary of any [city or county] officer or person
whose compensation is paid out of the city treasury ...
See also id. §§ 233, 1571, 1583.
(8) Law of April 6, 1900, ch. 298, § 3 [1900] N.Y. Laws 638 provided that the wages of
municipal day laborers "shall not be less than the prevailing rate for a day's work in the same
trade or occupation in the locality within the state where such public work . . . is per-
formed .. " This method of setting wages was upheld against constitutional attack for
indefiniteness in Campbell v. City of New York, 244 N.Y. 317, 155 N.E. 628 (1927). This
provision is now set forth in N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 220 (3), (5)(e) (McKINNEY 1965).
(9) Charter Amendatory Act of 1901 § 56 provided:
It shall be the duty of the board of aldermen upon the recommendation of the
board of estimate and apportionment, to fix the salary of every officer or person
whose compensation is paid out of the city treasury other than day laborers, and
teachers. .. .
For the same effect as to county officers, see id. § 1583. Section 1091 empowered the Board
of Education to fix the salaries "of all members of the supervisory and the teaching staff."
Section 1089 empowered the Board of Education to fix the salaries of examiners.
(10) 1938 Charter § 67 provided:
The power is vested in, and it shall be the duty of the board of estimate, except as
otherwise provided in this charter or by statute, to fix the salary of every officer or
person whose compensation is paid from the city treasury, other than day laborers.
(11) 1963 Charter § 813 provides:
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in the City's budget-whether state or local officials. As a result of
these attempts, various cases were brought to determine the extent
of the budget managers' powers over salaries. These cases held: that
the salaries of State officials were mandatory, therefore the City
(i.e., budget managers) could exercise no control;83 that the salaries
The personnel director [of the City of New York] shall have the following powers and
duties... :
i. To develop and submit to the mayor standard rules governing. . . career, salary and
wage plans providing for the creation, abolition and modification of positions and
grades and fixing salaries of persons paid from the city treasury, subject to the provi-
sions of this charter, the civil service law and other applicable statutes. . . .
The submission to the Mayor is, in reality, a submission to the Bureau of the Budget, which
is the dominant partner in the salary fixing process.
Inclusion of a line in the budget at a given salary does not fix the salary at that rate (the
"terms and conditions" of the budget permit the Budget Director to set a lower salary for
non-mandatory salaries in the vacancy-filling or appointment certificate). See McGovern v.
Patterson, 273 App. Div. 35, 75 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 530, 80 N.E.2d
667 (1948); Lyons v. City of New York, 82 App. Div. 306, 81 N.Y.S. 1079 (lst Dept), aff'd,
176 N.Y. 609, 68 N.E. 1119 (1903); cases cited in note 73 supra.
Obviously, when a specific statute provides for fixing the salary for a given office or job,
that statute governs. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. City of New York, 50 Misc. 2d 977, 271 N.Y.S.2d
1019 (Civ. Ct. 1966).
83. See, e.g.,Cox v. Mayor of New York, 103 N.Y. 519, 9 N.E. 48 (1886); Taylor v. Mayor
of New York, 67 N.Y. 87 (1876); Dixon v. City of New York, 31 Misc. 102, 63 N.Y.S. 794 (Sup.
Ct. 1900); Landon v. Mayor of New York, 7 Jones & Spencer 467 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1875);
Quinn v. Mayor of City of New York, 63 Barb. 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872), afj'd, 53 N.Y. 627
(1873).
New York City has continued to try to exercise discretion over nondiscretionary (State
mandated) appropriations. See, e.g., Wingate v. McGoldrick, 279 N.Y. 246, 18 N.E.2d 143
(1938) (mandatory appropriations for employees of the Surrogate's Courts of Kings and
Queens counties); In re McAneny, 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187 (1922) (mandatory City ap-
propriation for the transit commission); O'Loughlin v. Prendergast, 219 N.Y. 377, 114 N.E.
860 (1916); Wilmerding v. O'Dwyer, 272 App. Div. 35, 69 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1st Dep't), rev'd, 297
N.Y. 664, 76 N.E.2d 325 (1947) (mandatory appropriation to finance subway deficit caused
by wage increase for subway employees even if appropriation is financed by borrowing); The
Brooklyn Citizen v. City of New York, 258 App. Div. 657, 17 N.Y.S.2d 765 (2d Dep't 1940)
(mandatory appropriation for payment of legally required newspaper notices); People ex rel.
Eidt v. Hylan, 199 App. Div. 965, 191 N.Y.S. 945 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 232 N.Y. 602, 134 N.E.
589 (1922) (mandatory pension system appropriations by City); People ex rel. Cropsey v.
Hylan, 199 App. Div. 218, 191 N.Y.S. 195 (1st Dep't 1921), aff'd, 232 N.Y. 601, 134 N.E. 588
(1922) (appropriation for officers in the Supreme Court Kings County); Henderson v. LaGuar-
dia, 182 Misc. 1071, 48 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 892, 51 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st
Dep't 1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 728, 61 N.E.2d 456 (1945) (mandatory appropriation for salaries
of employees of Bronx County Surrogate's Court); Shevlin v. LaGuardia, 166 Misc. 473, 2
N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 254 App. Div. 922, 5 N.Y.S.2d 556 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 279
N.Y. 649, 18 N.E.2d 43 (1938) (mandatory appropriation for court attendants in the Supreme
Court and Appellate Division, First Department); Bronx Parkway Comm. v. Hylan, 119 Misc.
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of offices created by the City were discretionary, that is, the City
could adjust such salaries as it saw fit;8' and that the State Legisla-
ture may convert a county (i.e., "State") office to a City office, in
which case the salary by inference was then controllable by the
City.,,
Other attempts to increase control over expenditures resulted in
the use of an assortment of gimmicks which rendered actual budget
control illusory to some extent.
For example, in 1860, the carryover of certain appropriations to
succeeding fiscal years was permitted by the State Legislature,8
with the Common Council given the discretionary power to transfer,
within the current budget, excess appropriations to areas of defi-
785, 198 N.Y.S. 271 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 206 App. Div. 688, 200 N.Y.S. 915 (1st Dep't), afl'd,
236 N.Y. 593, 142 N.E. 297 (1923) (mandatory city appropriation for the Bronx parkway
commission). See also Tobin v. LaGuardia, 276 N.Y. 34, 11 N.E.2d 340 (1937), enforcing
Law of May 2, 1893, ch. 518, [1893] N.Y. Laws 1113 (the Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment must appropriate annually a sum not exceeding $8,000 to the trustees of the Seventh
regiment armory building); People ex rel. Kehoe v. Leo, 233 N.Y. 173, 135 N.E. 234 (1922)
(the World War I "G.l. Bill" prevented abolition of jobs simply by omission of a particular
job's budget line from the budget schedules); Poucher v. LaGuardia, 240 App. Div. 271, 269
N.Y.S. 582 (1st Dep't 1934) (a state mandated appropriation for the teachers' retirement
system which was to be "sufficient for its obligations" made the amount to be appropriated
by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment discretionary). But see People ex rel. Daly v.
York, 66 App. Div. 453, 73 N.Y.S. 331 (1st Dep't 1901), aff'd, 171 N.Y. 627, 63 N.E. 1120
(1902) (mandamus will not lie for an omitted mandatory appropriation).
84. McCarthy v. LaGuardia, 172 Misc. 260, 14 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd 259
App. Div. 710, 19 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd, 283 N.Y. 701, 28 N.E.2d 715 (1940);
Brinck v. Mayor of New York, 16 Hun 340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878) (involving the action of the
Board of Estimate and Apportionment in striking from the budget the entire sum requested
by the metropolitan police district's state police courts for janitors' salaries); Dolan v. Mayor
of New York, 6 Hun 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 67 N.Y. 609 (1876) (involving the clerk of the
grand juries of the Courts of Oyer and Terminer and General Sessions in New York County);
Broschart v. City of New York, 166 Misc. 515, 3 N.Y.S.2d 18 (City Ct.), aff'd, 255 App. Div.
776, 7 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1st Dep't 1938) (involving officers in the office of the sheriff of Bronx
County); Reilly v. Mayor of New York, 10 N.Y.S. 847 (Sup. Ct. 1890) (involving a subpoena
server in the District Attorney's office).
85. People ex rel. Taylor v. Dunlap, 66 N.Y. 162 (1876) (involving the office of commis-
sioner of juries). See also Haggerty v. City of New York, 267 N.Y. 252, 196 N.E. 45 (1935).
Abrams v. LaGuardia, 174 Misc. 421, 21 N.Y.S.2d 891, aff'd, 262 App. Div. 724, 28 N.Y.S.2d
711 (1st Dep't 1941), afl'd, 287 N.Y. 717, 39 N.E.2d 933 (1942); Gresser v. O'Brien, 146 Misc.
909, 263 N.Y.S. 68 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 263 N.Y. 622, 189 N.E. 727 (1934). Non-mandatory
appropriations are discretionary, and the courts may not order that such an appropriation
even be requested. Modugno v. Baumgartner, 11 Misc. 2d 1022, 173 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct.
1958) (appropriation for a mosquito control program in the Department of Health).
86. Law of April 17, 1860, ch. 509, § 4, [1860] N.Y. Laws 1017 provided for carrying
forward appropriations for street cleaning, construction, and maintenance for a period of up
to five years.
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ciency. 7 "Out of this grew the abuse of over-appropriating for pro-
per purposes, and afterward transferring to the more questionable
objects";" that is, the popular appropriations would be over-
budgeted, and then brought forward to the succeeding year, when
they would be transferred to other, less popular, appropriations.
The State Legislature tried to eliminate this gimmick by forbidding
such transfers, in 1864.9 But, the problem arose again with the Law
of May 1, 1874,11 which authorized the transfer of appropriations to
"such other purposes or objects for which the appropriations are
insufficient, or such as may require the same."' Hoping to take
outrageous advantage of this section, the Board of Estimate and
Apportionment adopted by majority vote a resolution which at-
tempted to transfer past unexpended balances forward across sev-
eral years to finance an appropriation which was not even budg-
eted."2 A taxpayer brought suit to prevent this, and the court, in
Bird v. Mayor,3 held that the Board could not carry past unex-
pended balances forward to fund a defeated appropriation in the
current budget except from the year immediately prior to the cur-
rent budget year, and that, by unanimous vote only."4 This deci-
sion eliminated the possibility of gross abuse but still allowed the
same kind of gimmick in use prior to the 1864 statute."5 The use of
87. Id. See note 150 infra.
88. 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 4.
89. Law of April 25; 1864, ch. 405, § 2, [1864] N.Y. Laws 945 provided:
And it shall not be lawful for any amount authorized by this act, or of any amount
that may hereafter be authorized to be raised by tax for any specific object or purpose
for the use of the city, or of the county of New York, to be transferred and appropriated
to any other object or purpose than that contemplated and authorized by law.
90. Ch. 308, [1874] N.Y. Laws 362, re-enacted in Consolidation Act of 1882, ch. 410, §
207, [1882] N.Y. Laws 56. Although not considered as such, The Consolidation Act of 1882
"was in a very real sense a charter. . . . In point of conclusiveness . . . it was more truely a
charter than those which had gone before or those which were to follow. Neither the Greater
New York Charter of 1897 nor the Amendatory Act of 1901 repealed it." A. MACMAHON, THE
STATUTORY SOURCES OF NEW YORK CnTY GOVERNMENT 9-10 (1923) (footnote omitted).
91. Law of May 1, 1874, ch. 308, § 2, [1874] N.Y. Laws 363 authorized carrying forward
any "surplus or balance remaining unexpended of any appropriation then existing at the end
of the current fiscal year .. "
92. Bird v. Mayor of New York, 33 Hun 396, 397-98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884). This resulted
in a transfer to the general fund in 1884 of $2,678,002. N.Y.C. FINANCES, supra note 35, at
269.
93. 33 Hun 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884).
94. Id. at 398.
95. See note 89 supra.
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this gimmick certainly was not lessened by the decision in People
ex rel. Andrews v. Fitch"8 which held that a recent statute exempted
the Public Works Department and the Police Department97 from the
restrictions set forth in Bird v. Mayor."5
Those responsible for budget management were not the only offi-
cials who wanted control over expenditures. Executives with author-
ity to hire and/or spend would invariably try to increase such au-
thority.
Agency heads, for example, increased their expenditure power by
manipulation of the judgment fund. This was done by making
contracts (albeit not precisely according to statute)' for items for
which there were no appropriations, or at least insufficient appropri-
ations; typically, the City would be sued on the contract and de-
fault. Then, the judgment would be paid out of the judgment fund
which was empowered to borrow in order to pay judgment credi-
tors."'
96. 9 App. Div. 439, 41 N.Y.S. 349 (1st Dep't 1896), aff'd 151 N.Y. 673, 46 N.E. 1150
(1897).
97. Law of March 23, 1893, ch. 186, § 1, [1893] N.Y. Laws 314, amending Consolidation
Act of 1882, ch. 410, § 207, [1882] N.Y. Laws 56 which provided: "Nothing in this act
contained shall in any wise apply to the department of public works or the police department
of the city of New York."
98. 33 Hun 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884).
99. 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 4.
100. See notes 102, 103 infra.
101. It was not possible to work the judgment fund gimmick completely within the bounds
of the law. It can reasonably be inferred, for example, by reading section seven of the 1849
Charter (no money paid without an appropriation) in pari materia with section 23 thereof
(contract-letting to conform to ordinances of the Common Council) that the Common Council
was permitted to approve only contracts for which there existed sufficient appropriations.
Sections eight, twelve, and fifteen of the 1853 Charter provided further details concerning the
contract procedure. These charters were reinforced by the Ordinances of the Mayor, Alder-
men & Commonalty of the City of New York, ch. VIII, § 35 (Valentine ed. 1859). Therefore,
any contract for which there was not a sufficient appropriation (as in the usual judgment fund
gimmick) would be void, the ultra vires act of the Common Council being analyzed as a
violation of the statutory requirements for contracting. See notes 102, 103 infra.
The New York City Budget Appropriation Act for 1859, ch. 489, § 4, [1859] N.Y. Laws
1123 provided for expenditure of funds only in accordance with appropriations, and then, in
section five, provided that whenever the Comptroller shall have "reason to believe that any
judgments. . . against the. . . city . . . shall have been obtained by collusion, or founded
in fraud, he . . . [shall] take all proper and necessary means to open and reverse [such
judgments] and to employ counsel for such purpose. Nevertheless, the New York City Budget
Appropriation Act for 1863, ch. 227, § 7, [1863] N.Y. Laws 412 permitted borrowing to pay
for judgments for which there was no (sufficient) appropriation.
Unlawful contracts were further dealt with in the Common Council Compensation Act, ch.
533, § 2, [1865] N.Y. Laws 945 which made it a misdemeanor to "vote for any contract in
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The courts tried to limit this abuse by rigorously applying the
principles of contract law as it related to municipal corporations,
consistently holding that no valid contract would be found where an
agreement was made in violation of any statutory requirement for
contracting with a municipal corporation and, therefore, recovery
would not be permitted,"°2 not even in quantum meruit for work
completed. 0
violation of law, or any appropriation unauthorized by law, or in excess of the amount
authorized by law, or for any illegal or injurious disposition of corporate property, rights or
franchises .. "
The New York City Budget Appropriation Act of 1866, ch. 876, § 10, [1866] N.Y. Laws,
2070-71 sought further to prevent illegal contracts by providing that the City "shall not be
liable upon any contract made . . . for any object or purpose which is not expressly author-
ized by this act .... "This was renewed specifically in the New York City Budget Appropri-
ation Act of 1867, ch. 586, § 5, [1867] N.Y. Laws 1605.
The New York City Budget Appropriation Act of 1868, ch. 853, § 7, [1868] N.Y. Laws 2022
renewed the anti-collusion provision of the 1859 Budget Appropriation Act, ch. 489, § 4,
[1859] N.Y. Laws 1123. But, in a triumph for Boss Tweed, see N.Y.C. FINANCES, supra note
35, at 122, section seven was amended to authorize the Comptroller "in order to save expense
of litigation and interest arising on said claim, to adjust the same, and when adjusted, to duly
provide for its payment." The New York County Appropriation Act of 1868, ch. 854, § 2,
[1868] N.Y. Laws 2032 provided that no "judgment against the county of New York shall
be valid unless the claim on which the action is brought has been presented to the board of
supervisors. . . and passed on by them, or they have unreasonably refused or omitted to take
action on the same." To the same effect, see the New York City Budget Appropriation Act
of 1869, ch. 876, § 14, [1869] N.Y. Laws 2134.
The judgment fund payor (i.e., Comptroller) could have, we think, rightfully refused to pay
the judgment-claim, since it was based, ab initio, on a void contract. But in practice, the
payor apparently would look only to the judgment itself: having been properly issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the judgment-claim would be paid without question, despite
the statutory provisions cited above.
The Legislature, then, in attempting to eliminate the judgment fund abuse should have
focused on the invariable irregularity of the underlying contract involved. As such, a sound
remedy would have been to require the courts to determine the validity of the contract, not
allowing the City to suffer a default judgment without such determination. This remedy
would have eliminated the fund abuses entirely. Instead, the Law of May 4, 1866, ch. 876, §
10, [1866] N.Y. Laws 2070-71, legitimated some of the ultra vires contracts, by providing
that at the time of presentation of the judgment-claim, there should be no payment "beyond
the amount appropriated" to such contract. Today, this could be viewed as an equal protec-
tion of the laws problem, inasmuch as it sets arbitrary and capricious standards for validating
ultra vires contracts.
102. Appleby v. Mayor of New York, 15 How. Pr. 428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858) (enforcing the
lowest bidder provision).
103. See, e.g., Donovan v. City of New York, 33 N.Y. 291 (1865), enforcing 1857 Charter
§ 22 which prohibited payment against an appropriation "after the amount authorized to be
raised by tax for that specific purpose, shall have been expended." McSpedon v. Mayor, 20
How. Pr. 395 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1861) (enforcing the requirement of full disclosure of all work
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Judgment fund abuses continued, however,' so in 1866 the State
Legislature sought to eliminate them by statute, providing that "no
judgment in actions upon contract shall be entered by default or
otherwise, in any court, against said corporation, except upon proof
in open court, that the amount sought to be recovered in said judg-
ment still remains unexpended in the City treasury to the credit of
the appropriations to the specific object or purpose upon which the
claim sued for is founded."'0 5 The statute was challenged in Tribune
Association v. Mayor.10 The court held that the statute caused no
impairment of the plaintiffs contract, because the statute "does not
apply to the debt, but to the remedy,"'0 7 and was, therefore, consti-
tutional.
The statute, having thus withstood the acid test of legal theory,
and having become thereby established as the controlling law, was
to prove ineffective: the law, unfortunately, was widely ignored.'
data in the notice inviting bids).
Contracting in violation of contract requirements, has been a continuing problem. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. Mayor of New York, 68 N.Y. 23 (1876); T.A. Clarke Co. v. Board of Educ., 156
App. Div. 842, 142 N.Y.S. 166 (1st Dep't 1913); Williams v. City of New York, 118 App. Div.
756, 104 N.Y.S. 14 (1st Dep't 1907), afj'd, 192 N.Y. 541, 84 N.E. 1123 (1908); cf. Lowe v. City
of New York, 240 App. Div. 484, 270 N.Y.S. 216 (2d Dep't 1934) (concerning real property
acquisition).
The City Council may, absent an appropriation, contract for services in connection with
its organization and procedure for stenographic services for investigation proceedings as to
the qualification and election of some of its members. Chambers v. City of New York, 286
N.Y. 308, 36 N.E.2d 313 (1941); accord Smith v. City of New York, 289 N.Y. 517, 47 N.E.2d
35 (1943); Barry v. City of New York, 175 Misc. 712, 25 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 1963
Charter § 124.f. presently deals with this problem.
The rigor of the contract rules was greatly ameliorated by the Law of July 17, 1907, ch.
601, [1907] N.Y. Laws 1397 adding § 246 to The Greater New York Charter which provided:
The board of estimate and apportionment may, in its discretion, inquire into, hear
and determine any claim against the City of New York which has been certified to
said board in writing by the comptroller as an illegal or invalid claim against the city,
but which, notwithstanding, in his judgment it is equitable and proper for the city to
pay in whole or in part, and if upon such inquiry the board by an unanimous vote
determines that the city has received a benefit and is justly and equitably obligated
to pay such claim and that the interests of the city will be best subserved by the
payment or compromise thereof. . ..
104. 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 4.
105. Law of May 4, 1866, ch. 876, § 10, [1866] N.Y. Laws 2070.
106. 48 Barb. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867).
107. Id. at 243.
108. 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 4.
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III. Modern Budgeting
As previously noted, the technique of line-by-line scheduling was
first formally required in the 1873 Charter,"9 although at that time
it was not fully utilized as a budgeting device."' Over the years, it
was increasingly relied upon and, by 1908, was widely used. in City
budgeting."'
A major reason for this increased use was its popularity with
budget managers. This may seem surprising, but line-scheduling
actually enhanced their control over the budget, because it served
as an ironic cloaking device: the more it exposed, the less it re-
vealed."' Budgeters, realizing that with thousands of line-entries
109. See note 39 supra.
110. 1915 BUDGET PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 6.
111. Id. at 6-7.
112. An amusing illustration of such cloaking is found in E. COSTIKYAN & M. LEHMAN, RE-
STRUCTURING THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW YORK CITY 60 (1972), which, though describing an
event occurring over fifty years later than the events described at this point in the text, is by
no means anachronistic:
The executive budget is a formidable-perhaps the most formidable-instrument of
governmental power. It can be used, and has been used, by mayors to provide political
rewards and to administer political punishment. It can be used, and has been used, to
thwart policies that have apparently been approved. And whether in its simple line-
item form, arrayed as a performance budget, or in its more fashionable Program-
Planning-Budget Systems (PPBS) format, the document is rarely visible in all of
its particulars. It is possible to hide money in it in most ingenious ways. A clever
budget examiner may do so in such a manner that not even the mayor, whoever he
may be, will know exactly where certain funds are. Middle-level budget examiners are
able to modify, or even kill, programs that represent high policy decision. A New York
Times article [Tolchin, The Budget Mystique, May 24, 1972, at 36, Col. 2] described
certain aspects of the budget process as follows:
I've been here for almost two years, and I'm just learning where they hide the money,'
Alan Claxton, an assistant budget director, commented recently. "It's all coded
.... " The found money and lost jobs are all part of a budget process that is under-
stood by only a handful of officials. . . . The scope of the proposed budget-$9.5
billion to be given 87 city agencies that employ 400,000 people-almost guarantees that
detailed comprehension is beyond the grasp of almost everyone else, including high
officials in the Budget Bureau ...
One commentator has noted:
On the surface, the expense budget seems to be a storehouse of valuable information.
Expenditures appear to be meticulously detailed, and line schedules are available for
public inspection. But the line items do not add up to the real City budget . . .
[Tihere are thousands of dead lines in the budget, countless employees work out of
[budget] line or out of title, and "loans and borrows" distort the budget ac-
counts. . . . [Tihe line items present an inscrutable mass of detail.
STATE CHARTER REvisiON COMMISSION FOR NEW YORK CITY, CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES UNDER THE
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only a fitful spot-check of the proposed budget would be possible,
willingly embraced line-by-line scheduling.
Aside from line-by-line scheduling, no significant changes were
made until 1924.111 Thus, the 1897 Charter, as amended, 1 '4 and the
increasing use of the line-by-line schedule represent the style of New
York City budgeting for nearly twenty years. ' 5
During that time, it became apparent that, for a budget of the size
NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 150-51 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES].
For an example of a line-by-line schedule, see Appendix I.
113. In the same year, the State Legislature in passing the City Home Rule Law, ch. 363,
[1924] N.Y. Laws 698 (amended 1928), took action that would affect the budget operations
of New York City by allowing a greater measure of local self-government. Section ten of the
City Home Rule Law created a new legislature for the City by providing:
[T]he local legislative body of a city shall be the board of aldermen. . . or other board
or body now or hereafter vested by its charter . . . with jurisdiction to enact ordi-
nances, and, if there be a board of estimate and apportionment, shall include such
board of estimate and apportionment as a separate branch thereof. . . . If a local
legislative body of a city consists of more than one branch, the local legislative body
shall be known as the "municipal assembly" of such city.
The City Home Rule Law created an anomaly: two City Legislatures: (1) The Board of
Aldermen as ordinance-maker, (2) the Municipal Assembly as the maker of "local laws," that
is, laws, which, before passage of the City Home Rule Law, generally required approval by
the State Legislature. The Municipal Assembly continued until January 1, 1938 when the
1938 Charter took effect. See L. TANZER, NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 27 (1937); HISTORY OF THE
N.Y.C. LEGISLATURE, supra note 16, at 43-44.
This dual Legislature was certainly the most oddly structured in the City's history. Perhaps
the State Legislature reasoned, in part, that if budget control was a proper legislative func-
tion, then by making the (executive) budget management group a legislative body it would
have the best of both worlds-a small group of executives able to maintain tight control over
the budget and a proper system of checks and balances.
The hope was to create a City legislature more active and properly responsive to its newly-
granted powers. Unfortunately, it proved to be an unrealistic expectation:
But to those who had expected an active and independent body the Municipal Assem-
bly was a sore disappointment. By 1924 the Board of Aldermen was considered as
important to the city's government as a "fifth wheel." Its performance as the lower
branch of the city's home rule legislature brought about no change in its reputation.
Scheduled as fifteen minute sessions, the meetings of the Aldermanic Branch usually
lasted ten. Most of the time was spent on the invocation and roll call. Normally the
recommendations of the Committee on Local Laws were accepted without comment,
consideration, or dissenting vote.
Id. at 45 (footnote omitted).
114. See note 67 supra.
115. This period began around 1908. One observer has noted that the departmental esti-
mates were, even before the metropolitan consolidation in 1898 "exceedingly minute, giving
the salaries of each officer or employee, and the specific purpose of each expenditure." N.Y.C.
FINANCES, supra note 35, at 254.
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and complexity"' of New York City's, such a relatively informal
budget procedure was unsatisfactory, in that it resulted in an undue
focusing on the minutiae of the budget, and in a failure to examine
carefully overall budgetary consequences.117
In point of fact, the control systems that have traditionally oper-
ated in public budgeting are best characterized as audit check sys-
tems. This kind of conventional accounting approach fails to in-
clude in the overall budget analysis the net effect of a given appro-
priation."' Therefore, while that appropriation may be found to be
within the budget, it may, in fact, be "unproductive"; that is, it
may not be accomplishing what it was budgeted to do. As such, the
fact of that appropriation's budgeting-regardless of the fact that
it is properly displayed on a line-by-line schedule, and that the
budget books "balance"-should be reconsidered. Similarly, certain
items which have been beneficial for the City should also be re-
evaluated.
In an attempt to end this informality of budgetary process, the
Board of Estimate and Apportionment created on June 1, 1924,"11
the position of Director of the Budget as a mayoral office. 2 ° This
post was created out of a desire for a more professional budget
operation and in part, no doubt, to provide at least the appearance
of non-political discretionary spending and less political personnel
administration and contract purchasing. However, even after the
creation of the position of Director of the Budget, the City's annual
expense budget continued to be prepared by the Board of Estimate
and Apportionment.''
116. [1924] BUDGET FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK totalled $375.4 million in a volume of 180
pages.
117. For a later assertion to this effect, that is also valid for this period, see 1 MAYOR'S
COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT SURVEY, MODERN MANAGEMENT FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK
(1953). The Committee observed:
The line-item budget strangles management . . . without establishing effective or
constructive control, or giving the public adequate information as to what any depart-
ment is planning or is authorized to do.
Id. at 89.
Then committee-member Abraham D. Beame among others dissented from this majority
view of the committee. Id.
118. Id. at 90.
119. New York, N.Y., Bd. of Estimate, Calendar Res. No. 8 (1924). For citation to the
first budget line for "Director of the Budget," see note 122 infra.
120. N.Y.C. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 6, at 69.
121. HISTORY OF THE N.Y.C. LEGISLATURE, supra note 16, at 74. Until 1933 this document
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The effect of the Director on the budget operation was disappoint-
ing. He lacked a formal, independent staff2' and had no significant,
direct control over budget policy decisions.2 3 The City legislature,
therefore, amended the City Charter, in 1933,124 to provide for the
establishment of a Bureau of the Budget'25 (apparently composed of
the staff formerly used by the Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment) to be headed by the Director of the Budget who "shall be
appointed by and hold office at the pleasure of the Mayor."' 6
The Director of the Budget was to be responsible for the prepa-
ration of the budget.'27 Toward this end, there seems to have been
an attempt in the amendment to make the schedules more mean-
ingful by requiring the budget to "contain a complete program."'2
This was not successful, because the "program" system was not
comprehensively applied. That is, the concept of "program" is that
of a generic activity wherever located, and as such, must be applied
[the City's annual budget] was drawn up by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment on
the basis of estimates submitted by heads of departments and hearings before that body. Id.
122. [1924] BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 14. "Director of the Budget" does not show
a supporting staff.
123. H. LEHMAN, THE FINANCES AND FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF NEW YORK CITY, RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE SuB-CoMMITTEE ON BUDGET, FINANCE, AND REVENUE, OF THE
CITY COMMITTEE ON PLAN AND SURVEY XVii (1928):
At the present time the mass of estimates that come from the numerous departments
and offices are worked over by the examiners of the Board [of Estimate and Apportion-
ment] under the somewhat ill-defined joint direction of the Director of the Budget,
an appointee of the Mayor, and the Director of Investigations, an appointee of the
the Board of Estimate [sic]. It is these officers who prepare the budget.
124. Law of June 1, 1933, No. 11, [1933] N.Y. Local Laws 105, amending Charter Amen-
datory Act of 1901, 226.
125. Id. 226-b. Bureau of the budget. The bureau of the budget is hereby established,
the head of which shall be the director of the budget. He shall be appointed by and
hold office at the pleasure of the mayor, and his salary shall be as may be fixed from
time to time pursuant to section fifty-six of the Greater New York charter. He shall
appoint such subordinates and incur such expenses as may be duly provided for.
Employees of the several departments of the city shall be eligible for transfer and
appointment without examination to positions in the bureau of the budget so far as
necessity for their service exists, notwithstanding any other existing law or regulation
and the several sums of money appropriated in the city budget for the year nineteen
hundred thirty-three to pay the salaries or compensation of such employees shall be
transferred in due course to the bureau of the budget.
126. Id.




across the usual agency categories, if it is to be meaningful. For
example, "public safety" as a program would include all those
functions within a variety of agencies-police, fire, sanitation, etc.
-relating to public safety. The amendment severely constrained
the proper application of "program" by the requirement (in the
very same sentence) that this "program" reflect the traditional
City organization,'29 that is, police department, fire department en-
forcement units, sanitation police. Such a requirement, of course,
defeats the purpose of a "program."
An attempt was also made to provide for the much-needed
evaluation of budgetary consequences by empowering the Bureau of
the Budget to survey each City agency "for the purpose of ascertain-
ing instances of waste and duplication of effort to the end that
[the director of the budget] may recommend the remedy to the
mayor."' 3 ° These powers of the Budget Director were attractive pol-
itically in that they introduced an element of control heretofore
unavailable, with the onus of such control placed on a nonelective
executive official: the Director of the Budget.
A. The Unalterable Base
Among its many effects, the continual reliance upon the line-by-
line display has had the incidental effect of reinforcing the civil
service system, because the Mayor and his principal executives, who
were (and are) after all, politically sensitive, did not (and do not)
list job titles not in some way a part of the civil service classification
system. 3' Consequently, such officials would hesitate to eliminate
129. Id. which provided in pertinent part:
The purpose and intent is that the budget so prepared shall contain a complete pro-
gram giving the sources and estimated revenues of the city and county governments
and the amounts required for the administration, maintenance and operation of the
said governments. . . .The classification of these estimates shall be as nearly uniform
as possible and shall, as far as practicable, exhibit clearly the functions performed by
each department . . . and the purpose of appropriations made.
The provision on classification of estimates is now found, essentially unchanged, in NEw
YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ANN., ch. 6, tit. A, § 112-5.0 (1971).
130. Law of June 1, 1933, No. 11, [1933] N.Y. Local Laws 105.
131. The civil service merit system was created by Law of May 4, 1883, ch. 354, [1883]
N.Y. Laws 530. The civil service system is further reinforced, in two ways, by the collective
bargaining system: indirectly, by reinforcing the line-by-line display by impliedly incorpo-
rating it in the collective bargaining agreement, and directly, by using the civil service system
to describe the line-by-line display. For a discussion of collective bargaining, see text accom-
panying notes 251-62 infra.
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listed civil service titles, lest the already potent civil service consti-
tuencies object. It must be remembered that municipal employees
exert influence in two ways: that influence which reasonably organ-
izable employees exert on their employer; and, in addition, political
influence resulting from their status as voters (who tend to be politi-
cally active) capable of voting for (or against) the very employer in
question. 3 ' Thus, existing jobs are rarely eliminated, even though
new jobs must necessarily be created as government functions, pub-
lic needs, and available technologies change. This process of infinite
expansionism is known as "incremental" budgeting:'33 the base is
assumed to be virtually unalterable, ergo, the "logical imperative"
that the budget becomes adjustable only by addition. 3 ' However,
such alteration, though politically infeasible, is quite obviously nec-
essary because (as has recently been made apparent) the City is a
limited financial institution.
The problem, then, is clear: how to alter the "unalterable base."
One of the first innovations to appear in the budget as prepared
by the newly-created Bureau of the Budget was the "Required Ac-
cruals" entry.'35 This device was originally designed to provide an
adjustment for the statistically justified expectancy that all posi-
132. See, e.g. Darnton, Crisis Spawns Host of Plans to Save City N.Y. Times, Oct. 13,
1975, at 51, col. 7.
[T]he unions are a potent political force-they can campaign for or against a mayor
and lobby on behalf of special legislation in Albany-and a Mayor is especially vulner-
able to pressure from a discomforted [sic] public to avoid or end a strike.
Id.
133. See POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, supra note 81, at 62.
Budgeting turns out to be an incremental process, proceeding from a historical base,
guided by accepted notions of fair shares, in which decisions are fragmented, made in
sequence by specialized bodies, and coordinated through repeated attacks on problems
and through multiple feedback mechanisms.
Id.
134. The Local Law establishing the Bureau of the Budget provided in § 226-c for preser-
vation of the historical budget base: "the estimates shall include particularly and in detail,
the reasons for all individual increases or decreases compared with corresponding figures for
the previous year," now found, essentially unchanged in NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN.,
ch. 6, tit. A, § 112-6.0 (1971). Incremental budgeting is being increasingly discredited, and
suggestions are being made that budgeters start, not from a historical base, but from a "zero
base." See, e.g., P. PHYRR, ZERO-BASE BUDGETING (1973).
135. Required accruals were first budgeted in City of New York, Budget for 1924, although
there was already a "fund for Salary and Wage Accruals." See [1924] BUDGET FOR THE CITY
OF NEW YORK 6. The term accrual is not used here in its ordinary accounting sense of expenses
incurred or income earned, but, rather, as salary expense which has not been incurred.
[Vol. IV
EXPENSE BUDGETING
tions will not be filled all the time. Thus, a given agency might have
its appropriations reduced by, say, ten percent, because it is pre-
dictable that over the course of a year that agency would only use
an average of ninety percent of its personal service appropriations.
The "required accruals" device, therefore, would help to prevent
fraud by those controlling the payrolls, who might be tempted to
"appropriate" the excess for themselves, or the build-up of appro-
priations which could subsequently be transferred to other purposes
and which might, then, have to be annualized in future budgets.'3
When required accruals were first used as an entry, they reflected
the actual, predictable underexpenditure. Now, however, this entry
is used as a gimmick to enforce savings without making a cut in the
personal service schedules (the unalterable base). Thus, an agency
which would predictably use ninety percent of its appropriations
might now be given a "required accruals" entry of from twelve to
twenty-three per cent.' 37
This device leaves to the agency head some discretion as to which
positions should be filled.' 38 But as with most political solutions, this
technique for avoiding unpleasant decisions has resulted in an im-
proper ordering of priorities; instead of withholding appropriations
from the least beneficial items first, the least politically powerful
positions, regardless of value, tend to be those most reduced.' 3
136. The City's Bureau of the Budget uses "annualize" to refer to the cost for the balance
of a fiscal year; but as used here, it refers to providing the full fiscal year's cost at the then
cost thereof.
137. See, e.g., [1975-76] EXECUTIVE BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1154 providing with
respect to the Parks, Recreation and Cultural Affairs Administration, Program IV "Parks
Maintenance and Operations," the largest code thereof, a schedule total for the "Budget for
1974-1975 as Modified" (as of approximately March 15, 1975) of $56.7 million with required
accruals of $7.1 million; and, at 835, with respect to the Youth Service Agency, Program VI,
"Community Enrichment", a schedule total of $2.6 million with required accruals of $0.6
million.
138. This discretion will depend on the ability of an agency head to negotiate a blanket
vacancy filling certificate. See New York, N.Y. Exec. Order No. 20 (Aug. 1, 1974) providing
that "the Mayor may ... require . . . agencies to cooperate with the Bureau of the Budget
in realizing savings required to meet potential budget deficits that may arise during the fiscal
year. . . ." The nearly hilarious irony of the verb "cooperate" shows up in the process of
negotiating "excess accruals," that is, those accruals required in excess of the budgeted
accruals which may be as much or more than the required accurals. When this happens, the
"supporting schedules" became unsupportable schedules! See notes 139, 140 infra and ac-
companying text.
139. See note 137 supra. "Accrual" is defined as:
That portion of a personal service appropriation which it is anticipated will not be
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The unalterable base is also reduced by the accounting device of
"excess accruals." This is applied to a net appropriation, that is, an
appropriation which has already been reduced by "required ac-
cruals." During the course of the budget year, the Budget Director
might require that an agency head reduce a net appropriation by a
given amount; the agency head would be required to maintain a
percentage of the net appropriation as an "excess accrual." This
results in an enforced savings; it is a form of impoundment. 4 "
B. The New York City Charter of 1938
Obviously, the misuse of "required accruals" and "excess ac-
cruals" is a further impediment to the proper evaluation of "budget-
ary consequences." In addition, the Bureau of the Budget's survey
powers in this regard were still far from adequate. So, the 1938 City
Charter revised and expanded the visitatorial authority of the
Budget Director to provide that in the course of preparing the
previously-mentioned surveys' of the various departments, the
Bureau of the Budget could "require any agency, or any officer or
employee, to furnish data and information and to answer inquiries
pertinent to such survey."'' On the basis of these surveys the
Bureau of the Budget was to ascertain each agency's annual bud-
getary needs, prepare the expense budget for the fiscal year begin-
ning on July first of each year,' and submit this proposed budget',
spent in a fiscal year because of retirements and terminations of staff.
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFYING THE EXPENSE BUDGET 17 (1974). "Re-
quired accruals" probably started as a response to the Great Depression. See A. BUCK, BUD-
GETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 27 (1954). So successful was
this technique that the Bureau of the Budget would, in time, assess "excess accruals," that
is accruals against actual appropriations, which is a form of impoundment.
140. 1963 Charter § 123.b., as amended, (1975) provides that the Mayor "may set aside
specified sums as necessary reserves .... "
141. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
The 1938 Charter was adopted by referendum on Nov. 3, 1936, effective Jan. 1, 1938,
pursuant to Law of Aug. 18, 1934, ch. 867 [1934] N.Y. Laws 519. The full legal history of
the 1938 Charter and the full text thereof may be found in L. Tanzer, New York City Charter
(1937).
142. 1938 Charter § 113.
143. Id. § 111. "The [1938] charter establishes, a fiscal year commencing July 1, in place
of the calendar year on the basis of which the city formerly operated ... " L. TANZER, NEW
YORK CITY CHARTER 59 (1937).
The final budget under the calendar year system of The Greater New York Charter was
for an eighteen-month period, January 1, 1938, through June 30, 1939. 1938 Charter § 952.b.
The 1938 Charter permitted the new Board of Estimate to adopt a substitute budget for the
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to the Board of Estimate' 5 for adoption by the Board and, subse-
quently, by the Council.'46
This was just a small part of the Bureau of the Budget's increased
involvement with the budget process as formalized by the 1938
Charter.' So great was the Bureau's increased involvement that
there was, in fact, a shift in actual control over the budget from the
Board of Estimate to the Bureau of the Budget.' The most signifi-
period from January 1, 1939, through June 30, 1939. Id. The Budget for 1938 withstood attack
on its validity in Dixon v. LaGuardia, 166 Misc. 889, 2 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd,
253 App. Div. 881, 2 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1st Dep't 1942). The case stemmed from an attempt to
adopt a new budget for 1938 in January 1938. The court held in favor of budget finality, that
is, once a budget is adopted for a given period it may not be changed except pursuant to spe-
cific authorization by law. Id.; accord People ex rel. McGowan v. Havemeyer, 1 Hun 61 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1874) (concerning the budget for 1873).
The finality principle has been consistently observed by the courts in dealing with New
York City's budget. See, Rushford v. LaGuardia, 280 N.Y. 217, 222, 20 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1939),
holding that the applicable charter section read "by the lamp of technical knowledge . . .
of municipal budget making . . . [empowered the Board of Estimate to create, abolish, or
change the salary of a position] only when it adopts a budget." Accord, Cariello v. City of
New York, 10 App. Div.2d 846, 199 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1st Dep't 1960); Bergerman v. Gerosa,
208 Misc. 477, 144 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Rasmusson v. City of New York, 88 N.Y.S.2d
103 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 904 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 532, 93 N.E.2d 344,
94 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1950). McCarthy v. LaGuardia, 283 N.Y. 701, 28 N.E.2d 715 (1940) (holding
that the Board of Estimate may reduce incumbents' salaries only when it adopts a budget);
Thoma v. City of New York, 263 N.Y. 402, 189 N.E. 470 (1934) (holding that reduction
in grade, and consequent reduction in salary, within the same position title during the budget
year is not improper).
144. 1938 Charter §§ 111-32. "The budget, as it is now known, is termed by the new
charter 'expense budget' to distinguish it from the capital budget." L. TANZER, NEW YORK
CrrY CHARTER 59 (1937). (footnote omitted).
145. The 1938 Charter shortened the name of the "Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment" to "Board of Estimate". 1938 Charter § 61. However, it retained the same member-
ship, id., and the same weighted voting requirements, id. § 62.
146. Id. 33 121-25.
147. The New York city charter exercised the power granted by the City Home Rule
Law, ch. 363, § 10, [1924] N.Y. Laws 699 to abolish the Municipal Assembly. For a descrip-
tion of the Municipal Assembly, see note 113 supra.
148. See MAYOR'S COMMITrEE ON MANAGEMENT SURVEY, 2 MODERN MANAGEMENT FOR THE
Crry OF NEW YORK 80 (1953) providing that "the budget gives no outsider, or even the Mayor
and the Board of Estimate, a basis for judging whether a particular bureau is overstaffed or
understaffed .... " GOVERNING N.Y.C., supra note 80, at 368 provides:
In essence, the budget process is one in which the Mayor formally proposes to the
Board of Estimate an almost incredible detailed "line item" budget which the Budget
Director has in fact prepared and of which only he and his staff are masters.
But a court can miss this point. In Dixon v. LaGuardia, 166 Misc. 889, 898, 2 N.Y.S.2d
466, 474, the court stated:
The fear against hasty action which authorized the expenditure of huge sums of money
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cant control which shifted to the Bureau, the power to make certain
modifications,'49 was shifted by indirection.
To understand this fully, the notion of "appropriation" must be
examined. Prior to 1938, "appropriation" was a relatively unde-
fined, generic term.'50 As such, within the same budget it might be
was wholly allayed by the rigid and elaborate program set forth in the . . . charter.
With respect to . . . the making of the budget, there was thus no fear that the tax-
payers of the city of New York would not obtain the product of cool, calm, and consid-
ered judgment.
149. See text accompanying notes 158-74 infra.
150. The Charters of 1830 (§ 18), 1849 (§ 7), 1857 (§ 31), 1870 (§ 101), but not the 1871
amendment thereto, and 1873 (§ 112) use the term "appropriation" or "sum appropriated"
without definition as in the passage cited in text at note 8.
The New York City and County Budget Appropriation Act of 1860, ch. 509, § 4, [1860]
N.Y. Laws 1021 provided:
[fIn case any original appropriation so made by the mayor and common council of
said city shall be found insufficient for the purpose for which the same was made, it
shall be lawful for the said mayor and common council, and they are hereby empow-
ered, upon the recommendation of the comptroller, to authorize by resolution or ordi-
nance a transfer to the credit of such deficient appropriation of such amount or
amounts as may be deemed necessary from any other appropriation or appropriations
in which there may be an excess or surplus over the estimated expenditure to be made
for the current year, on account of which the said last mentioned appropriation or
appropriations were made, and the amount or amounts so transferred shall be deemed
and taken the same and may be expended in the same manner as though the same
had been orignally embraced in such deficient appropriation.
In some years, different phrasing was used, e.g. the New York City Budget Appropriation
Act of 1864, ch. 404, § 2, [1864] N.Y. Laws 939 provided:
[Ilt shall not be lawful for any amount authorized by this act . . . to be transferred
and appropriated to any other. . . purpose. . . unless the. . . purpose for which the
amount was originally appropriated. . . shall have been fully accomplished and com-
pleted.
The New York City Budget Appropriation Act of 1874, ch. 308, § 2, [18741 N.Y. Laws 363
provided:
[Tihe said board of estimate and apportionment shall have the power at any time to
transfer any appropriation for any year which may be found, by the head of the
department for which such appropriation shall have been made, to be in excess of the
amount required or deemed to be necessary for the purposes or objects thereof, to such
other purposes or objects for which the appropriations are insufficient, or such as may
require the same . ...
Thus was born the modern budget modification. With the incorporation of the above
quoted provision in the Consolidation Act of 1882 § 207, as amended, Law of March 23, 1893,
ch. 186, § 1, [1893] N.Y. Laws 314, the budget modification became a permanent part of
the City's budget process, repeated in every Charter since. See 1963 Charter § 124; 1938
Charter §§ 127, 128; the Charter Amendatory Act of 1901 § 237; The Greater New York
Charter § 237.
An early interpretation of the Charter Amendatory Act of 1901 § 237 is Colihan v. Miller,
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used to describe both a single job-position (e.g., "Mayor") and the
entire uniformed City police force. In the 1938 City Charter, section
123 established parameters for the concept of "appropriation," by
describing it as not the equivalent of a single (supporting) line-item
and limiting its use to "code items only.""' Now, in legal theory as
well as practice, "appropriation" would apply to any grouping of
expenses, that is, a traditional aggregation of lines assigned a
"code"'52 proposed by the Bureau of the Budget and adopted by the
Board of Estimate. "3 The lines themselves were no longer the
budget but only a supporting schedule to the budget' 54-the budget
proper would now be the various code-appropriations.'55
72 Misc. 140, 131 N.Y.S. 99 (Sup. Ct. 1911), which held that the Board of Estimate and
Apportionment could transfer funds appropriated to positions in that year's budget to posi-
tions already established at fixed salaries but not otherwise funded in that year's budget. But
the Board of Estimate and Apportionment could not, under the guise of modifying the
budget, adopt, during the budget year, a resolution reducing incumbents' salaries, an action
which it is empowered to take only when it adopts the annual budget. Rushford v. LaGuardia,
280 N.Y. 217, 20 N.E.2d 547 (1939). Nor can the budget be modified by (unlawfully) abolish-
ing a position during the budget year and then imposing, as a condition to the discharged
incumbent's restoration to the payroll, an unpaid leave of absence for the discharge period.
Toscano v. McGoldrick, 300 N.Y. 156, 89 N.E.2d 873 (1949).
151. 1938 Charter § 123.
152. See CITY OF NEW YORK COMPTROLLER'S MANUAL (1972 ed.).
153. 1938 Charter § 123. See also Brooklyn Pub. Library v. Craig, 201 App. Div. 722, 194
N.Y.S. 715 (2d Dep't 1922) holding that a supporting schedule for a contract appropriation
was advisory only and not binding on the contractor. This position was taken embryonically
in 1938 Charter § 128 which provided:
The director of the budget, upon request of the head of an agency, shall, with the
approval of the board of estimate, have power during any fiscal year to transfer an
appropriation or part thereof from one line to another within the same schedule,
provided the total appropriation for the applicable code item is not increased.
154. Despite this change of status of the supporting schedules, Wilmerding v. LaGuardia,
268 App. Div. 496, 52 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1st Dep't 1944), held that the 1938 Charter required:
a comprehensive scheme for subitemization of budgetary code items through support-
ing schedules so as to (1) permit a comparison of items with similar appropriations for
preceding years, (2) facilitate public hearings and discussion concerning the necessity
for the proposed items of expenditure, and (3) enable the City Council to examine the
budget as proposed and determine which items are proper and necessary.
Id. at 498, 52 N.Y.S.2d at 172. The plaintiff, Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., was an economist of
note, author, inter alia, of PUBLIC SPENDING (1943).
155. For a discussion of the cases dealing with the level of detail required in the executive
budget and in the appropriation acts for the State of New York, see Quirk, Standing to Sue
in New York, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 429, 472-82 (1973).
The problem was put succinctly by Judge Breitel in Hidley v. Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d 439,
271 N.E.2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1971) (dissenting opinion):
Despite language in [People v. Tremaine, 281 N.Y. 1, 21 N.E.2d 189 (1939)] to the
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Thus, the line-by-line schedules, having become so surfeit with
micro-data as to be rendered indecipherable' and thereby useless
as control devices,'57 were replaced by the smaller, theoretically
more manageable, code -appropriations schedule. The line-item
schedule would now become merely advisory.
The impact of all this becomes clear when viewed in conjunction
with section 128 of the 1938 Charter. That section granted the Bu-
reau of the Budget the discretionary power to transfer money from
one (supporting) schedule line or lines to any other line or lines
within the same appropriation. 5 ' Approval of the Board of Estimate
was required,'59 but such approval was a foregone conclusion, be-
cause the Board had been delegating such authority to the Director
of the Budget via the terms and conditions since 1929.11 When one
considers that the Charter made the very structuring of the appro-
effect that a definable level of [budgetary] itemization by the Governor is required
of him, that language is no more than explanatory elaboration of the process ....
The rub is the meaning of itemization.
There is a constitutional mandate to itemize. There is no constitutional definition
of itemization . . . and no inflexible definition is possible. Itemization is an accordion
word. An item is little more than a "thing" in a list of things. A house is an item, and
so is a chair in the house, or the nail in the chair, depending on the depth and purpose
of the classification. The specificness or generality of itemization depends upon its
function and the context in which it is used. In one context of a budget or appropriation
bill and description of 1,000 police officers within a flexible salary range would be
specific and particular; in another it would leave the appointing power with almost
unlimited control. In one context an "item" of $5,000,000 for construction of a particu-
lar expressway might seem specific; in another, void of indication when, how, or where
the expressway or segments of it would be constructed. This suggests that there is
something of a battle over words in debating the need for items, rather than a grappling
with a functional concept.
Id. at 444, 271 N.E.2d at 533-34, 332 N.Y.S. at 691.
156. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
157. MAYOR'S COMM. ON MANAGEMENT SURVEY, 1 MODERN MANAGEMENT FOR THE CiTY OF
NEW YORK 7 (1953) states:
[Tihe expense budget documents are themselves swamped by detail. They report the
number of clerks and pencils but they do not give an understandable picture of what
the departments are expected to accomplish.
158. This type of modification is, according to the oral tradition of the City's Bureau of
the Budget, known as a "Modification Within" the same appropriation or simply as an "MW
modification." For the pertinent text of the 1938 Charter see note 153 supra.
159. 1938 Charter § 128.
160. Broderick v. City of New York, 295 N.Y. 363, 378, 67 N.E.2d 737, 744 (1946) (dissent-
ing opinion):
Ever since 1929 the budgets of the city in their "terms and conditions" have authorized
the budget director to modify personal service schedules within code appropriations.
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priations controllable by the Bureau of the Budget and made the
line-entries of these appropriations only advisory, the extent of the
grant of power under section 128 becomes obvious.
Modifications between or among appropriations,' too, were eas-
ily controllable by the Bureau of the Budget, although they were not
so completely within the Bureau's discretion as were modifications
within appropriations. Section 127 of the Charter provided that
such modification power was to be exercised by the Board of Esti-
mate." 2 However, requests for such modifications were made
through the Director of the Budget'63 and, although authority to
approve these requests was not delegated to the Director in the
terms and conditions, it is safe to say that the Board did not con-
sider itself to be antagonistic to the Bureau and that approval of the
Board of Estimate, when requested by the Director, was routinely
given.164
The 1873 Charter'65 marked the establishment of the "executive
oligarchy"'6 6 as a legitimate institution by allowing a de facto dele-
gation of legislative power to an elective, executive management
group (the Board of Estimate and Apportionment).' 7 The 1938
Charter resulted in a further de facto delegation of budget control
since the budget, instead of being controlled by the Board of Esti-
mate, would now be controlled in fact by the Bureau of the
Budget-a totally interior, non-elective executive group, thus en-
hancing the notion of an executive oligarchy. At this point, the
input of any legislature, City6 ' or State, into the budget is so remote
as to lack even the pretense of reasonable legislative involvement.
161. This type of modification is, according to the oral tradition of the City's Bureau of
the Budget, known as a "Modification Across" appropriations or, simply, as an "MA."
162. The 1938 Charter § 127 provides:
The board of estimate shall have power during any fiscal year to transfer such part of
any appropriation as it shall deem to be in excess of the amount required to any
purpose for which it shall deem the appropriation for such year to be insufficient,
except that [mandatory appropriations could not be so transferred] ....
For provisions pertaining to mandatory appropriations, see note 197 infra.
163. See GOVERNING N.Y.C., supra note 80, at 367.
164. Id. at 368.
165. See note 38 supra.
166. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
167. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
168. 1938 Charter § 21 which exercised the authority granted under the City Home Rule
Law, ch. 363, § 10, [1924] N.Y. Laws 699, changed the City Legislature to its present general
structure-a single-chambered council.
1975]
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The delegation in the 1873 Charter was unsuccessfully challenged
in Townsend v. Mayor. , 9 The "delegation" resulting under the 1938
Charter'7 ° was challenged in Broderick v. The City of New York,' 7'
decided by the court of appeals in 1946. In that case, the Director
of the Budget exercised his discretionary section 128 power to trans-
fer an appropriation within a schedule (as "approved" by the terms
and conditions)'72 by creating ten new deputy fire chief positions
and eliminating ten battalion fire chief positions. The court of ap-
peals held that the Board of Estimate had specifically to approve
each such modification, and that the Board could not give its ap-
proval via the terms and conditions: "In that view . . . the official
duty of the Board of Estimate under section 128-the duty to pass
judgment upon actual transfers of appropriations- cannot be
delegated."'7 It is clear that the court was straining to reach a
construction of the Charter that was plainly unreasonable. The
Charter provisions did intend to have delegated to the Director the
power which he attempted to exercise in Broderick, but the court
was responding to its own fear of having the budget controlled so
significantly by a virtually autonomous bureaucracy, the Bureau of
the Budget. In spite of Broderick, the Director continued to exercise
unfettered control over modifications within appropriations, and a
later, similar, court challenge resulted in a specious distinguishing
of Broderick,"' thereby upholding the Director's activities. It be-
169. See note 49 supra.
170. 1938 Charter § 128.
171. 295 N.Y. 363, 67 N.E.2d 737 (1946).
172. Id. at 370, 67 N.E.2d at 739.
173. Id. at 371, 67 N.E.2d at 740.
174. Abarno v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 1053, 1059, 157 N.Y.S.2d 513, 520 (Sup. Ct.
1956), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 1040, 178 N.Y.S.2d 1022, (1st Dep't 1958), which largely stemmed
from an action by World War II veteran firemen who were suing to receive longevity credit
for promotion and pay purposes for the enforced leaves without pay required by the City as
a condition of their initial one-day appointments, to prevent loss of their civil service list
status by reason of time-related lapse of the list. The City, relying on Broderick, (see text
accompanying notes 170-74 supra), claimed that the creation of the new firemen positions
was void ab initio in that there was never any final action by the Board of Estimate on the
measure. 3 Misc. 2d at 1059, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 520. The court, while correct in its result,
confused budgets with budget lines, distinguishing Broderick as involving "two budgets" (it
actually involved two budget lines), whereas Abarno apparently involved only one budget
line. 3 Misc. 2d at 1059, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 520-21. That distinction, unless it involves two units
of appropriation, that is, an MA, see text accompanying note 161 infra, rather than an MW,
see text accompanying note 158 infra, is meaningless, as is the observation that there was no
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came apparent that the Director's powers were not to be limited in
this regard, and there has been no subsequent challenge to the
power of the Director of the Budget to make modifications within
appropriations.
IV. The Present Law
The New York City Charter of 1963 streamlined the procedure for
making budget modifications175 and, in so doing, made the process
more demonstrably "executive."' 78 For example, the authority to
make modifications within "units of appropriation"'77 ("MW's") 7 8
creation of high paying jobs and elimination of lower paying jobs in Abarno as there was in
Broderick.
175. 1963 Charter § 124.
The 1963 Charter was drafted by the Charter Revision Commission of the City of New York
established pursuant to Law of March 9, 1961, ch. 87, [1961] N.Y. Laws 107, adopted at the
general election of Nov. 7, 1961 and fully effective, Jan. 1, 1963.
176. See STATE CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION FOR NEW YORK CITY, CENTRAL BUDGET IS-
SUES UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 98 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CENTRAL BUDGET
ISSUES] which provides:
The current form of "identical" Council-Board participation in budget making evolved
from a desire to strengthen the budgetary role of the City Council, but its actual effect
has been to bolster the Mayor's position.
In addition to the budget modification methods outlined in the text accompanying notes 177-
85 infra, amendment of the 1963 Charter pursuant to § 42 is available.
177. "Unit of appropriation" is the fundamental concept of the budget modification pro-
cess prescribed by the 1963 Charter § 124.a.-.c. Section 124.e. of the 1963 Charter defines a
unit of appropriation as either (1) all of the personal services lines in the supporting schedule
"for a particular program, purpose, activity or institution" (Id. § 112.b.) together with that
portion of the "other than personal services" (OTPS) which supports that unit of personal
service lines, or (2) all of the OTPS appropriated for a particular agency. Thus, there is no
longer any need for an OTPS MA since an entire agency is, by charter definition, a single
unit of appropriation. Id. § 124.e. Indeed, as to OTPS budget administration, Bureau of the
Budget involvement has been substantially reduced by virtue of the Mayor's specific non-
withdrawal of MW power. New York, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 20, § 5 (Aug. 1, 1974). See note
178 infra.
178. Section 124.a. of the 1963 Charter provides:
Subject to the provisions of this charter, of the civil service law and of other applicable
statutes, changes in schedules, within units of appropriation, activities or institutions,
may be made prior to the commencement of or during the fiscal year by the head of
the affected agency except that the mayor may withdraw from such affected agency,
and upon such withdrawal, himself exercise the power to make such changes in such
schedules applicable to such agency. Such changes shall be published in the City
Record and written notice thereof shall be given to the mayor and the comptroller not
less than ten days before the effective date thereof.
This section was amended in 1975 to make each agency's MW power more emphatic: each
agency will administer its own personal services units of appropriation within each unit,
subject to a quarterly spending allotment for each unit of appropriation. In setting these
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is given directly to the particular agency head, subject to a discre-
tionary power given to the Mayor to remove the authority to him-
self. Also, the authority to make modifications between or among
"units of appropriations" or to transfer any unassigned unit(s) of
appropriation to any agency ("MA's")'7" is left to the discretion of
the Mayor,8 0 who is required, at least ten days before the modifica-
tion is to take effect, to publish notice of the modification in the City
Record,"' and to give written notice to the Comptroller. 2
The only involvement left to the Board of Estimate by the 1963
Charter regarding the budget modifications processes concerns
modifications between or among agencies and modifications that
increase the total amount of the budget ("MN's").183 In this situa-
allotments, the Bureau of the Budget will allow for setting aside "necessary reserves," that
is, "excess accruals." See text accompanying note 140 supra.
179. Section 124.b. of the 1963 Charter provides:
The mayor may during any fiscal year transfer part or all of any unit of appropriation
within any agency to another unit of appropriation within such agency or part or all
of any unit of appropriation which has not been assigned to any agency, to any unit of
appropriation within any agency for the purpose for which such unassigned unit of
appropriation was originally established. Each such transfer shall be published in the
City Record and written notice thereof shall be given to the comptroller not less than
ten days before the effective date thereof.
Note that provision is made for an unassigned "unit of appropriation," which may permit
a substantial budgetary change without Board of Estimate or City Council involvement. The
entire "Miscellaneous" budget as displayed in the [1975-76] EXECUTIVE BUDGET OF THE CrrY
OF NEW YORK 331 for 1974-75 was $916,446, 425 of which Program VIII-Unallocated Appro-
priations-was $6,673,607. Id. Thus a considerable sum may be unassigned. 1963 Charter §
124.b., as amended, (1975) eliminates the unassigned unit of appropriation and limits the
present (purely mayoral) MA to changes of plus or minus five percent.
180. Note that the 1963 Charter § 123.c. permits the Mayor to impose "limitations on the
transfer or expenditure of funds appropriated in the budget .... " Pursuant to this, the
Mayor may force additional accruals through staff layoffs. See note 135 supra. This process
is not an MN modification. Allen v. Lindsay, 66 Misc. 2d 705, 321 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct.
1971). For an explanation of the MN, see note 183 infra.
181. 1963 Charter § 124.b.
182. Id. Note that id. § 124.d. forbids any budget modification decreasing a mandatory
appropriation. For mandatory appropriations under the 1963 Charter, see note 197 infra.
183. 1963 Charter § 124.c. provides in pertinent part:
Upon recommendation of the mayor, the board of estimate and the council may during
any fiscal year transfer part or all of any unit of appropriation from one agency to
another, or establish a new unit of appropriation within funds lawfully available there-
for, or transfer all or part of any unit of appropriation for the purpose of establishing
or adding to any new unit of appropriation, or change the terms and conditions of the
budget; but in any such case there shall be public hearings . ...
This section providing for a Modification New (or simply, MN) has been administratively
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tion, the Board of Estimate and the Council, acting upon the recom-
mendation of the Mayor, have authority to approve the transac-
tion. '8 However, public hearings must first be held upon ten days'
notice (published in the City Record) and the Comptroller must be
given written notice of the transaction within ten days after its
occurrence." 5
The Charter, then, as to "modifications within" and "modifica-
tions across" by-passed the limitations imposed by Broderick:' the
Mayor, not the Board of Estimate, has the authority to make these
modifications; therefore, the issue whether the Board is wrongfully
delegating the authority to make such modifications to the budget
director is mooted-the Board cannot delegate what it does not
have. Now, it is the Mayor who "delegates" the authority to the
budget director. 7 The Board does not even inferentially control this
delegation, because the Board no longer issues the terms and condi-
tions since that, too, has become a mayoral function:' the Mayor
is now required to publish the terms and conditions in the budget;88
they can be found deeply ensconced in the supporting schedules. 10
Thus far, there has been no court action challenging the power of
the Charter-referendum itself to delegate this heretofore "non-
delegable," "legislative" function of the quasi-legislative Board of
Estimate to the Mayor, or, for that matter, to question whether the
Board should have had such power in the first place. Nor is there
interpreted as not requiring Board of Estimate or Council action when a new unit of appropri-
ation is to be entirely funded by state or federal funds. 1963 Charter § 124.f., as amended,
(1975) requires that the budget adoption procedure be used in the case of
(1) any proposed amendment to the budget respecting the creation of new units of
appropriation, or (2) the appropriation of new revenues from any source, or (3) the
proposed use by the city of previousiy unappropriated funds received from any source.
184. 1963 Charter § 124.c.
185. Id. § 124.f., as amended, (1975) provides that the regular annual budget adoption
procedure shall be used.
186. See note 160 supra.
187. The Bureau of the Budget is in the Executive Office of the Mayor. 1963 Charter §
11l.a. The Director of the Budget is appointed by the Mayor, id., and serves at his pleasure,
id. § 6.b.
188. Id. § 117.a.9.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Supporting Schedules, [1975-76] EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 649-52. The supporting schedules are no longer even part of the budget. See text
accompanying notes 154-55 supra.
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likely to be such a challenge, although as to this last point there are
some interesting obiter dicta in Bergerman v. Lindsay.'1
The purpose of that action was to declare the Charter powers of
the Board of Estimate constitutionally invalid because, assuming
the Board's activities to be legislative, the Board composition vio-
lated the mandate of one-man, one-vote.
The lower court concluded that the major part of the "legislative
and governmental" powers of the City lay with the Council; there-
fore, the Board could not be considered a "general governing body"
subject to the one-man, one-vote principle.'92 Nevertheless, that
court stated: "Admittedly, however, until the 1963 revision of the
City Charter, the Board did exercise far greater legislative powers
than it has today and perhaps, until then, would have lent sub-
stance to plaintiff's alleged grievance .. . ."I" The lower court was
prepared to admit, apparently, that the Board had once had such
significant legislative powers as to bring it within the ambit of the
"general governing body" definition which would have required it
to conform to the one-man, one-vote requirements as to its member-
ship. Unfortunately, though the court stated that much of the
Board's "legislative" power had shifted to the office of Mayor, the
dicta were not extended to a discussion of the implications of such
a shift.1"'
In addition to the extensive grant of power over budget modifica-
191. 25 N.Y.2d 405, 255 N.E.2d 142, 306 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 955
(1970).
192. 58 Misc. 2d 1013, 1019-20, 297 N.Y.S.2d 421, 428.
193. Id. at 1016, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
194. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra. Earlier cases had, however, indicated that
the whole budget process "is not legislative." See, e.g., Lazinsk v. City of New York, 163 App.
Div. 423, 433, 148 N.Y.S. 808, 816 (1st Dep't 1914).
Other cases provide more particular indication of the legislative nature of the City's annual
expense budget: People ex rel. Collins v. Ahearn, 120 App. Div. 95, 104 N.Y.S. 860 (1st Dep't
1907) holding that a budget appropriation for salaries in gross of a borough "bureau of
highways was not a legislative establishment of a borough bureau of highways." The expense
budget may, though, legislate negatively. People ex rel. Kelly v. Dooley, 169 App. Div. 423,
155 N.Y.S. 326 (2d Dep't 1915) holding that omission of salaries for more than a stated
number of employees is a determination that the omitted number of employees shall not
receive a salary; accord, Ross v. LaGuardia, 287 N.Y. 28, 38 N.E.2d 117 (1941). But when a
budgeted reduction results in administratively permissible ordering of longer working hours,
there has been no usurpation of the City Council's legislative powers. Montreuil v. Board of
Estimate, 10 App. Div. 2d 266, 198 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1st Dep't 1960); cf. Natilson v. Hodson,
264 App. Div. 384, 35 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 842, 47 N.E.2d 442 (1943).
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tions, the process of adoption of the budget has also been made
subject to the control of the Mayor, primarily through his appointee,
the Budget Director:9 5 the agency heads continue to submit their
estimates to the Director;' 8 the Director prepares the "executive"
(i.e., proposed) budget,'97 as well as the supporting line-item sched-
ules; "' and, to this end, the visitatorial powers of the Budget Direc-
tor as found in the 1938 Charter have been retained.199
The input of the Council or, for that matter, of the Board of
Estimate regarding the adoption of the budget is nominal, at best.00
Either body may make any change it deems proper in the executive
195. 1963 Charter § lll.a.
196. Id. 112.a.
197. Id. § l1l.b., 117 no longer require, as did the 1938 Charter § 119.1 that the executive
expense budget include a report of the previous year's expenses. "The absence of these data
makes it difficult to identify and separate the portions of the budget attributable to new and
expanded programs from mandatory costs." CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 83.
The new Charter amendments restore this requirement. 1938 Charter § 117.b.2., as amended,
(1975).
Additional items that are probably mandatory are included in the NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE, ch. 6, tit. A, § 117.a.10-1.0 (1972). As to the Seventh regiment armory building, see
note 83 supra.
In addition to the mandatory budget items, see note 83 supra, the 1963 Charter sets forth
the following mandatory appropriations: various city sinking funds, id. ch. 11; debt service,
id. § 113.a.3; the fund for extraordinary costs for snow and ice removal, id. § 117.a.6; tax
deficiency account, id. § 127; tax appropriation and general fund stabilization reserve fund,
id. § 128; sinking fund of the City of New York, id. § 271; the water sinking fund of the City
of New York, id. § 272; the rapid transit sinking fund of the City of New York, id. § 273; and
the transit unification sinking fund of the City of New York, id. § 273-a. See also id. §§ 113,
117 for more general provisions to the same effect.
The tax appropriation and general fund stabilization reserve fund, popularly known as the
rainy day fund, has been subjected recently to gimmicking by the addition in 1964 and 1968
through 1975 of a provision mandating clear weather, that is by providing that no appropria-
tion need be made thereto for the indicated years. 1963 Charter § 128.g., as amended, (1975).
The Bureau of the Budget uses mandatory in yet another sense: with respect to the submis-
sion of the annual departmental estimate, the current year's base-the unalterable base-is
called the mandatory request, anything else the discretionary request. See W. FARR, L. LIEB-
MAN & J. WOOD, DECENTRALIZING CITY GOVERNMENT: A PRACTICAL STUDY OF A RADICAL PROPOSAL
FOR NEW YORK CITY 121 (1972). Since the discretionary request is invariably ignored, the less
appropriated not required gimmick, see note 234 infra, becomes crucial to increasing one's
unalterable base by more than the legally "mandatory" amounts.
198. 1963 Charter § 117.b.2., as amended, (1975).
199. Id. § 111.b. See note 129 supra.
200. Compare 1963 Charter § 120 with id. § 121.c. In an attempt to make the City's
expense budget less executive or mayoral, the 1963 Charter § 120.b., as amended, (1975)
provides for adoption of a single expense budget (instead of separate adoption by the Board
of Estimate and City Council). However, 1963 Charter § 120.d., as amended, (1975) will
effectively deny the Mayor his Board of Estimate votes in connection with adoption of the
expense budget.
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budget, but each change is subject to veto by the Mayor.'' In order
to override a mayoral veto, a change made by either body must be
submitted to both, and both must pass the identical change by a
two-thirds vote.02
Thus, the Board of Estimate, having become "quasi-legislative"
in character, was to suffer the same fate as the City legislature 203
-its power was transferred to the Executive! As for the City
Council, it can be said that by adding section 124(f) 201 to the
Charter (giving itself total control over its own appropriation-
modifications), the Council spared itself the ultimate indignity of
having to ask the Executive to exercise the legislature's power on
the legislature's behalf.
A. Program Budgeting
Aside from the shifts in control,2  the most significant effect
which the 1963 Charter has on the budget process is the requirement
that it "be a program budget206 and not a line item budget.
20 7
The program concept is a serious attempt to provide an output
analysis; it is, simply, an attempt to determine the net effect of
budget appropriations. Essentially, programing has come to mean
a micro-analytic system2 8 in which appropriation-objectives are
201. In a further attempt to make the expense budget less executive, 1963 Charter §
121.a., as amended, (1975) will effectively deny the Mayor a veto of any Council-Board of
Estimate reduction or elimination, and id. § 121.b., as amended, (1975) will lessen somewhat
the vote needed to override a mayoral budget veto.
202. 1963 Charter § 121.c.
203. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
204. 1963 Charter § 124.f.
205. See text accompanying notes 175-90 supra.
206. Programming was first used by military planners. PROGRAM BUDGETING 86-87 (D.
Novick ed. 1965). It was considered impressively successful and introduced into the entire
federal establishment by a presidential memorandum of Aug. 25, 1965. Id. at v.
207. STATE CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION FOR NEW YORK CITY, FINAL REPORT 3 (1961)
provides that the expense budget is "[t]o be a program budget and not a line item budget."
New York City has tried "performance budgeting" beginning with the 1956-57 expense
budget. The supporting schedules for that year contained a number of schedules of units of
work performed (e.g., number of innoculations by the Department of Health) related to
manhours expended. [1956-57] EXPENSE BUDGET FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK. This effort does
not appear to have decreased reliance on the line item budget or to have improved the quality
of budgeting in New York City. For a general discussion, including New York State's experi-
ence, see Symposium, Performance Budgeting: Has the Theory Worked?, 20 PUB. AD. REV.
63, 69 (1960).
208. For an argument that microanalysis is "too particular" and that macroanalysis is
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converted into data, which data, in turn, are more readily suscepti-
ble to formulaic comparison-analysis, thereby providing the budget
planner with the opportunity to make more informed, more mean-
ingful decisions as to the most useful allocations of scarce resources.
In the words of a prominent writer: 0 9
It focuses on the decisionmaking process, particularly the problems of data
and analysis. Its first effort is simply the rational ordering of inputs and
outputs, in which the initial emphasis is on the identifiable outputs-major
objectives of government processes. It then attempts to order the inputs
-government activities produced by manpower, material, real estate-so
that comparisons among wide ranges of alternatives are feasible and mean-
ingful.
Program budgeting starts with the structuring of the problem and ends
with analysis of the data. Among the analytical tools, cost-benefit or cost-
utility analysis that compares benefit or utility (outputs) with resources or
costs (inputs) is a most prominent one.
As applied in New York City,21 program budgeting consists of
four broad ideas: (1) a budget lexicon which arrays government
costs or budget estimates in output terms (rather than inputs or
administrative groupings as in line item budgeting); (2) a rigorous
mathematical analysis of the cost-benefit or cost-utility of various
output arrays; (3) a system of rigorous mathematical analysis of
alternate ways of reaching a given goal before the appropriation is
defined; (4) a cost-utility or cost-benefit analysis of the cost of the
called for, see Foster & Smith, Allocation of Central Government Budgets Over City Regions,
6 URBAN STUDIES 210, 212 (1969).
209. PROGRAM BUDGETING, supra note 206, at viii.
210. CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 68. This effort, which began informally
in 1967, was deliberately "opportunistic rather than systematic and comprehensive."
Hearings on The Planning-Programing-Budgeting System: Progress and Potentials, Before
the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 89 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings].
Program-planning-budgeting (PPB) became:
a separate but unequal component of the budget process. The examiners were in
command of the all-important [budget] modifications . . . and it did not take agen-
cies long to discover that PPB had little to do with budget lines. Yet PPB, as an
analytic change agent, was selectively used by the Mayor and budget officials for some
key policy decisions.
CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 69.
Indeed, the separation was complete-the line budget operation was on the twelfth floor
of the Municipal Building and the program budget on the thirteenth. Every City budget
officer knew that budget power lay on the twelfth floor.
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life-of-the-program, or the cost of the program over at least a five-
year period.
Because there was no statutory specification limiting the City's
budget to a particular program technique,"' all of the above ideas
appear in the City's budget to some degree. Budget directors for the
various "superagencies" 1 were also free to determine the technique
or techniques to be used, with varying degrees of success.213
Program budgeting, achieved by using any one of these tech-
niques, or any combination of techniques, has the potential to "re-
shape" the unalterable base,"' thereby potentially making its var-
ious components more open to scrutiny and objective re-evaluation.
This "reshaping" effect can be easily illustrated by the use of a
hypothetical budgeting project."' Suppose a City manpower agency
was charged with maintaining full employment in New York City,
with particular emphasis upon the unemployed and underem-
ployed. The traditional line item budget categories for this project
might appear as follows:
211. See note 207 supra. A consultant to the'State Charter Revision Commission for the
City of New York found that:
The [1963] Charter says very little about the content (as opposed to the form) of the
Mayor's budget or the accompanying budget message. This is consistent with prevail-
ing administrative theory that details of the budget process should be excluded from
the basic law.
CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 81.
212. The superagencies are those agglomerations of the more traditional City agencies
first specifically defined in THE MAYOR'S TASK FORCE ON REORGANIZATION OF NEW YORK CITY
GOVERNMENT, CRAco REPORT (1966). The superagencies, known as administrations, are, with
the exception of the Human Resources Administration, defined in the 1963 Charter chs.
56-63-A. The Human Resources Administration is defined in New York, N.Y., Exec. Order
No. 28 (Aug. 14, 1966).
213. Frederick Hayes, former City Budget Director, in a prepared statement, noted:
[The Human Resources] [A]dministration was the first City agency to launch its
own PPBS effort without outside assistance. It presented for the fiscal year 1967-68, a
completely new budget structure which identified expenditures by functional program
areas and objectives. This has been a remarkable accomplishment for an agency which
has virtually had to organize itself from scratch, and which is charged with administ-
ering some of the City's most critical and innovative programs.
1967 Hearings, supra note 210, at 97.
214. See text accompanying notes 131-34 supra.
215. This hypothetical budgeting project is taken from, but is not the same as, the budget
programs for the Department of Employment, Human Resources Program. See [1975-76]
EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK 315-18.
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I. Administration and Central Operations
II. Neighborhood Centers
III. Federally Funded Activities
IV. State Funded Activities
V. Employee Fringe Benefits
This array is convenient for audit check purposes. But it does not
explain, really, what result the appropriation is intended to pro-
duce. The same project arrayed according to a program budget tech-
nique (e.g., a budget lexicon) might be displayed this way:
Program I Development of New Jobs Within the City
Program II Training of the Unemployed for (these) New Jobs
Program III Training of the Underemployed for (these) New Jobs
Program IV Placement of those Trained into New Jobs
Program V Follow Up of Those Placed
Program VI Development of Careers for Those Placed
Program VII Research
This array when examined with a statement of the project's
goals-for example, how many new jobs are to be developed-is
obviously much more meaningful to a budget planner (or to a legis-
lature) than the typical line item display. This array is also advan-
tageous in that sub-standard performance becomes easier to detect,
sub-standard performance being hitherto all but undetectable.
However, this program budget array creates a series of adminis-
trative and audit check difficulties. For one, the source of funds
(City, State, Federal, private) is no longer identified, thereby neces-
sitating a subsidiary source-of-funds budget with a comparable sub-
sidiary accounting system. Also, the usual administrative structure
(e.g., "Job Corps") which is useful in determining the total cost of
a given administrative function no longer exists. To supply this, a
subsidiary administrative budget must be created with a compara-
ble subsidiary accounting system.21 The need for salary control, too,
216. Section 123.a. of the 1963 Charter provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, no unit of appropriation shall be available for
expenditure by any agency until a schedule fixing positions and salaries or setting forth
other expenses within such unit of appropriation, established subject to the provisions
of this charter, of the civil service law and of other applicable statutes, shall have been
approved by the mayor, copies of which schedules shall be filed by the director of the
budget with the comptroller, the department of personnel and the affected agency. To
the extent that such a schedule or any amendment or modification thereof departs or
differs from the itemized information and supporting schedules included in the budget
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requires that each employee appear as a total entity somewhere in
the audit check system; each employee's total salary needs to be
shown on one control line, though his performance might straddle
several programs. For example, in the program budget illustration
used above it is apparent that a single employee could be perform-
ing in Programs II, III, and IV. A system of "crosswalks,"'217 then, is
necessary if salary control is to be maintained; that is, an account-
ing control system is needed which lists a single employee on one
control line and arrays under that control line a distribution by
person-hours of that employee's time according to the different pro-
gram functions the employee performs, insuring that the employee
receive one (and only one) paycheck per pay period.
Unquestionably, this is an enormous undertaking. But, it is made
even more so, inasmuch as the accounting system is headed by an
independently elected official outside of the budgeting system: the
head of the accounting system is the Comptroller;21 the head of the
budgeting system is the Mayor.219 The Comptroller and the Mayor
are often political competitors and,2 ' predictably, neither is usually
willing to subordinate his system to that of the other.
These difficulties result, unfortunately, in a compromised pro-
gram budget in order that no traditional cost item, such as an em-
ployee's salary, be attributed to more than one program.2" For our
hypothetical budget project, a typical compromise has been:
message as submitted by the mayor . . . such schedule, amendment or modification
shall be published forthwith in the City Record.
Unhappily, instead of being treated as an administrative budget subsidiary to a program
budget, it has continued to be treated as the budget.
217. "Crosswalks" refers to an elaborate system of cross-references in which each item in
the line budget can be totally tracked into the program budget and vice versa.
218. 1963 Charter § 93.1
219. Id. §§ l1.a., 116.
220. A consultant to the State Charter Revision Commissioner for the City of New York
found that:
During the few hectic days the Board and the Council have to review the executive
budgets, the Comptroller's skill and information are indispensable. He can . . . pro-
vide the Board of Estimate with alternatives to the Mayor's budget.
CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 98.
221. A program budget presupposes a soundly functioning accounting system. Alas, that
is just what New York lacks; as put by one business member of the newly created Emergency
Financial Control Board, "Fundamentally, this city does not have an accounting system. I
simply cannot conceive of a $12-billion operation without an accounting system." Darnton,
The Control Board and How It Works, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1975 at 43, col. 4. As to federal
funds, there is a constitutional duty to "account." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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Program I Administration
Program I Executive Administration
Program III Field Operations
Program IV Job Development
Program V Training and Placement
Program VI Federally Funded Activities
Program VII State Funded Activities
Program VIII Research
Program IX Employee Fringe Benefits
This compromise array has several adverse effects, the most ob-
vious of which is the increase in the number of "units of appropria-
tion, ' 2 2 which causes a corresponding rise in the number of MA2 3
modifications. 24 Also, the budget lexicon becomes vague and ulti-
mately ineffective as a tool for defining governmental costs or
budget estimates in output terms.
Thus, budgeting is left in a thoroughly disadvantageous position:
budget analysis and planning are not at all advanced; and more
purely executive rewriting of the budget occurs via the increase in
modifications.
222. As previously explained, there must be at least one unit of appropriation for each
program. See note 177 supra.
223. For a definition of "MA" modifications, see notes 161, 179 supra.
224. Ideally, under a program budget format, each agency (budget entity) would be a
single unit of appropriation, thereby permitting each agency head who is entrusted with the
1963 Charter § 124.a. ("MW") power to exert MW and MA control over his own line budget
without Bureau of the Budget involvement, thereby permitting the Bureau of the Budget to
turn to larger concerns, but "[tihe Bureau is seemingly not concerned with encumbrances,
free balances, and rates of expenditures (the normal approaches to budgetary controls) but
rather with transfers and modifications ... in the line-item appropriations." A. BUCK, BuDG-
ETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SURVEY OF THE CrrY OF NEW YORK 34 (1951). A consultant
to the State Charter Revision Commission for the City of New York found that:
Administration of the line schedules produces a massive flow of paper work and ties
up over half of the Budget Bureau's staff. It involves thousands of minor and routine
transactions, few of which have much to do with agency policies or performance. The
mass of line controls makes it difficult for the Budget Bureau and the agencies to focus
on objectives and results. Their attention is diverted to the lowest level of budget
aggregation.
CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 132.
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B. More Gimmickry
Sections 1514 and 1515 of the 1963 Charter, when read in pari
materia, continue the long-standing requirement of a balanced
budget."2 5 Gimmickry, some of which is as equally longstanding,22
is sometimes used to circumvent this requirement. Section 125 of
the Charter, for instance, permits the carrying forward within a
given appropriation of the previous year's unexpended, unencum-
bered City tax levy funds into the first six months of the current
year's budget. This has an "inflationary" impact on that appropria-
tion's program: if the program were budgeted for twenty million for
the year and, in addition, carried forward five million from the
previous year, it would have appropriations, obviously, of twenty-
five million for that year; the following year, though, the agency
head would request budgeting of twenty-five million for the program
(instead of twenty, or twenty plus a reasonable percentage increase)
in order to keep it operating at its current level.
At budget-adoption time, "balancing" can be made easier by
overly-generous revenue estimation, which estimation, formerly a
function of the Comptroller, 21 is, under the present Charter, largely
a mayoral function and part of the budget message. 2 1
The Mayor and the State officials with whom he is negotiating,
are anxious to reconcile the difference between the executive budget
and the funds available. Understandably, the estimation of reve-
nues becomes subject to rather optimistic re-evaluation. If, after a
budget is agreed upon and adopted, this re-evaluation figure should
prove incorrect, the resultant shortfall is usually covered by "budget
notes."12
Anticipated receipts from State and Federal sources, which are
"reappropriated"' 30 in the City budget, are also subject to this opti-
mistic over-evaluation. If a particular program is being considered
225. Section 1515 of the 1963 Charter, as amended, (1975) will reinforce this requirement
by adding a final sentence:
The tax rate shall be such [as] to produce a balanced budget within generally ac-
cepted accounting principles for municipalities.
226. See text accompanying notes 87, 108 supra.
227. 1938 Charter § 115.1.
228. 1963 Charter §§ 117.b.3.-.4. See also id. § 113; CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note
112, at 157.
229. CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 158.
230. Federal and state funds are, of course appropriated through the legislative processes
therefor. The City of New York, unlike most cities, "re-appropriates" these already appropri-
ated funds in its own budget, which swells the total budget substantially. Localities which
do not re-appropriate federal and state funds handle such funds as memorandum accounts.
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by Congress, City budget planners may prematurely include a per-
centage of the program expected to be allocated to New York in the
City budget. If the program as finally adopted by Congress is less
than anticipated (and therefore the funds for New York City are
less) or if the percentage allocated to the City is less than expected,
the deficiency, if already spent by the City, is covered by revenue
anticipation borrowing made possible by an amendment to the
(State) Local Finance Law. 3'
In counter-point to over-estimation of revenues and Federal ap-
propriations, another gimmick for finessing the requirement of a
balanced budget is under-estimation of expenditures. Specifically,
this might be accomplished by under-calculating certain continuing
obligations, such as those to the City pension system, on the basis
of outmoded actuarial assumptions.23
Thus, the budget is "reduced" because contributions to pensions
are minimized. These insufficient contributions to the pension sys-
tem result in the development of significant "unfunded accrued
liability. ' 33 This liability, in turn, leads to the practice of using
fund capital-instead of interest produced by such capital-to meet
the current pension obligations; carried to its extreme-the total
depletion of fund capital-this gimmick could result in payment of
the yearly pension system obligations entirely out of the annual
expense budget, or worse, bankruptcy of the pension system.
A significant gimmick for balancing the budget is also one which
involves, although indirectly, the underestimation of expenditures.
The gimmick is a bookkeeping entry: "Less Amount Not Required
Unappropriated." '' This gimmick is based on the same principle as
the "Required Accruals" ' 5 entry; if it is not possible to fund fully a
program and, at the same time, maintain a balanced budget, a part
of the appropriation will be subtracted from the total ("Less
Amount Not Required Unappropriated") on the assumption that
the program will not be operating at one hundred percent capacity,
231. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00 a.36 (McKinney 1968).
232. See, e.g. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1975 at 1, col. 7.
233. This "unfunded accrued liability" has been estimated at about $6.1 billion. Id. at
56, col. 4.
234. See, e.g., Supporting Schedules [1975-76] ExEcuTmiv BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 4.
235. See text accompanying note 135 supra.
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one hundred percent of the time. Clearly, application of this gim-
mick to several programs can go a long way toward balancing the
budget. Afterward, should the entry prove to have been too large,
that is, should the amount actually needed prove to have been
"underestimated," the difference will be covered by "budget
notes. "230
The "Less Amount Not Required Unappropriated" entry can also
have an inflationary impact. An agency head can request increased
funding for the ensuing year by dropping the entry from the pre-
vious year's budget. The agency head can defend this increased
funding by describing it as not an increase in the program itself, but
merely an increase in the spending rate of that program.
If these gimmicks are not adequate or available, the requisite
budget balance 237 might be accomplished by shifting an appropria-
tion out of the expense budget and into the capital budget. The
capital budget is a wholly borrowed budget, 238 ordinarily used exclu-
sively for capital construction and maintenance. However, a series
of amendments to the Local Finance Law 3' has allowed certain
traditional expense items to be paid by long-term (capital) borrow-
ing, hence chargeable to the City's capital budget. The process, once
begun, was quickly expanded to include items more and more re-
mote from the general understanding of "capital": in 1960, capital
planning which did not result in actual construction was treated as
a capital expense;4 0 in 1964, the cost of special censuses was made
chargeable to the capital budget; 24 in 1968, job and business oppor-
236. "[Any shortfall in actual revenues can be funded by budget notes." CENTRAL
BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 158. These budget notes would be revenue anticipation
notes. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW §§ 25.00 c (McKinney 1968).
237. See note 225 supra.
238. See, e.g., 1963 Charter § 211.
239. Since the City's capital budget is wholly borrowed, a capital budget item must come
within the terms of the N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00 a.36(a) (McKinney 1968). A proper
capital budget item may be an expense budget appropriation. Paduano v. City of New York,
45 Misc. 2d 718, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 437, 260 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1st Dep't 1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 875, 218 N.E.2d 339, 271 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1026 (1967) (holding that fluoridation equipment may be an expense budget appro-
priation).
240. Law of April 14, 1960, ch. 735, [1960] N.Y. Laws 2047 (codified at N.Y. LOCAL FIN.
LAW § 11.00 a.62 (McKinney 1968)).
241. Law of April 3, 1964, ch. 284, [1964] N.Y. Laws 1116. (codified at N.Y. LOCAL FIN.
LAW § 11.00 a.71 (McKinney 1968)).
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tunity expansion programs were given the status of "capital
expense, '"242 inasmuch as they resulted in permanent improvement
of the salary-earning and therefore taxpaying potential of a class of
citizens. In fact, this "capital" expenditure is treated as having a
"period of probable usefulness" 4 ' of thirty years,244 thereby allowing
the borrowing for these programs to be done through the issuance
of up to thirty-year bonds. 45
Once adopted, the "balanced" budget is immediately subject to
modification. 4 ' Though this process of budget modification has
been simplified, it is nevertheless sometimes desirable, and quite
possible, to by-pass the formal processes of budget modification
when reassigning personnel; "position lending" is the gimmick by
which this unofficial re-assignment is accomplished. An agency
head, for example, might obviate the need for a formal "MA" modi-
fication by reassigning ("lending") the employee to a different unit
of appropriation without rearranging the budget.247
242. Law of June 22, 1968, ch. 1000, [1968] N.Y. Laws 2877 (codified at N.Y. LOCAL FIN.
LAWS § 11.00 a.73 (McKinney Supp. 1975)).
243. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00 a. Probable usefulness is the maximum (capital) loan
period for a given project purpose.
244. Id. § 11.00 a.73.
245. Id. § 11.00 a.
246. 1963 Charter § 124.a permits MW modifications within units of appropriation to be
made "prior to the commencement of" or during the fiscal year. This permits uninterrupted
continuation of changes made between March 15th, the closing date for modifications for
preparation of the supporting schedules, id. § 117.b.2, and July 1st, the date the succeeding
fiscal year begins, id. § 110. Id. § 124(a), as amended, (1975) omits this requirement, presum-
ably as unnecessary when each agency administers its own line schedule.
247. It has been observed that:
Line controls also' produce a budget of thousands of little "lies," as people work out
of title or out of location, or even for agencies other than those to which they are
budgeted. A frequent practice is for agencies to trade lines, that is, for one agency to
lend a line to another agency in exchange for a line that it wants. In the Hospital
Department alone there were an estimated 4000 "loans and borrows" during the fiscal
year July 1970-June 1971. The total magnitude of this practice is impossible to calcu-
late.
CENTRAL BUDGET IssuEs, supra note 112, at 132.
The problem of municipal employees working "out of title" is by no means a recent devel-
opment. A 1952 report to the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey recognized this
practice as widespread in New York's Civil Service. The report proposed tightening up
personnel administration controls through centralization. W. SAYRE & H. KAUFMAN, PERSON-
NEL ADMINISTRATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW YORK CITY 734 (1952).
Position lending defeats the result in People ex rel. O'Loughlin v. Board of Estimate &
Apportionment, 167 App. Div. 76, 152 N.Y.S. 625 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 216 N.Y. 625, 110 N.E.
1047 (1915). See note 248 infra.
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More significantly, even the "MN" modification (which, remem-
ber, at least technically, is not completely within the control of the
Mayor) can be by-passed. A politically sensitive agency (e.g., "Off-
ice of the Mayor") which might wish to appear officially to be
sparsely staffed can effect the informal transfer of employees into
it from other agencies; a reasonably well-staffed agency simply
"lends" employees to the sensitive agency. The employees involved
will continue to appear on the payroll of the lending agency.
Strictly analyzed, this lending is unlawful: it is a violation of the
Charter requirements pertaining to modifications.24 But, not only
is this gimmick winked at, it is institutionalized; the Vacancy Con-
trol Board, created in 196649 for the purpose of centralizing the
control of position-filling, actually facilitated the lending by issuing
a position "filling certificate"' 0 to the lending agency after the Bu-
reau of the Budget had been assured that the "lending" was to take
place.
A gimmick originally used to by-pass budget limitations, which
has become useful under current law, is the judgment fund abuse.25'
Retroactive salary increases for the previous fiscal year are often
contained in collective bargaining agreements.25 The Taylor Law
apparently legalizes such agreements; 53 nevertheless, the problem
248. See People ex rel. O'Loughlin v. Board of Estimate & Apportionment, 167 App. Div.
76, 152 N.Y.S. 625 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 216 N.Y. 625, 110 N.E. 1047 (1915), holding that the
Register of Deeds, Kings County could not compel a transfer of funds from vacant position
lines in order to pay already working temporary copyists hired to do the work of regular
copyists who had been assigned to out-of-title work.
249. New York, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 5 (Jan. 19, 1966) implemented by Mayoral in-
structions in New York, N.Y. Exec. Order No. 5 (Jan. 24, 1966), repealed New York, N.Y.
Exec. Order No. 24 (Dec. 9, 1974). The VCB, as it came to be known, consists of the First
Deputy Mayor, Director of the Budget, and the Personnel Director. The Examination Divi-
sion of the Bureau of the Budget is its staff, and, in effect, the VCB.
250. This is known as a "DM" (Directive of the Mayor) certificate.
251. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
252. CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 66.
253. The lawfulness of retroactive wage agreements had been recognized in Timmerman
v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 1075, 70 N.Y.S.2d
140 (2d Dep't 1947), which upheld a retroactive agreement between the City Board of
Transportation and its employees. The court, in finding the retroactive portion of the agree-
ment supported by consideration, and therefore not a gift of public funds, observed:
What stronger moral consideration for the retroactive feature of the pay increase could
there possibly be? The underpaid . . . and dissatisfied wage earners on the city's
transit system were induced to continue working and to forego their right to give up
their jobs on the assurance of the Board of Transportation that any increases would,
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of administering these increases in accordance with budgetary re-
quirements remains. To avoid having the full burden of these agree-
ments appear in the current budget, the increases are treated as a
"judgment and claim" against the City;54 they are then financed
through judgment fund borrowing. 5 Using this gimmick to finance
retroactive agreements has potentially grave consequences. We have
already seen that "judgment-fund contracts" were found, when
strictly construed, to be ultra-vires and unenforceable;"'6 they were
in excess of available appropriations and, as such, violated the sta-
tutory requirements governing municipal contracts. 57 This strict
contract rule apparently no longer obtains."' However, it must be
noted that the increases do apply, after all, to already existing,
formally adopted units of appropriation. The collective bargaining
retroactive increases, therefore, are nonetheless budget modifica-
tions. If these increases are paid from the judgment and claims
fund, and if they are budget modifications, then they are MN
budget modifications, because they obviously represent an increase
in the total budget; as MN modifications, the collective bargaining
increases are unlawful because they have not been made in accord-
ance with the requirements of section 124.c. of the 1963 Charter
concerning MN modifications. In fact, the increases not paid from
the judgment and claims fund, but paid through the particular
budget current when the agreement is made would, to the extent
paid by transferring "excess accruals," '59 also be MN modifications;
even though such a transfer would not increase the total budget it
would inevitably be, to some extent, across agencies, which by defi-
nition is an MN modification. Again, modification of the budget
would have been made in violation of the Charter MN modification
requirements, and would again be unlawful. If these increases are
if practical, be made retroactive to July 1, 1946.
Id. at 108; cf. Mahon v. Board of Educ., 171 N.Y. 263, 63 N.E. 1107 (1902), holding a
retroactive grant of pension rights to retired teachers void as gift of a public funds.
The "Taylor Act" is the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, N.Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW
§§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973). The Act apparently legalizes such agreements. Id. § 212 2.
254. CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES, supra note 112, at 66.
255. Id.
256. See note 101 supra.
257. See notes 102, 103 supra.
258. For the law governing New York City contracts, see the 1963 Charter, ch. 13.
259. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
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paid with actual funds hidden in the budget in operation when the
agreement is made, they would be either MW or MA modifications
to the extent funds were hidden within the units of appropriations
for the agency whose budget lines are increased. The increases
would be MA modifications, also, if they were hidden within an
unassigned unit of appropriation found anywhere in the City
budget. This hiding of funds, however-within an agency or in an
unassigned unit of appropriation-does not appear to be sufficient
to account for all the increases and does not, therefore, avoid the
MN problems encountered above.
These legal difficulties could be alleviated by presenting the in-
creases to the City Council and Board of Estimate for their (MN
modification) approval. This might incidentally serve as a check on
the size of such increases, because neither the Council nor the Board
would be likely to approve increases which openly exceed available
budgetary resources.
The lack of a significant check on the size of such increases cre-
ates, in part, the need to resort to gimmickry in funding the in-
creases.
Gimmickry and manipulation of budget modifications began as
an attempt by those managing the budget to expand their control.
But, the reasons for their use began to change as the Bureau of the
Budget began losing its usual control over such significant expendi-
tures as employee salary increases. Salary increase control, for ex-
ample, was diminished by a series of Executive Orders,s' which
260. The formal history of collective bargaining between the City of New York and its
employees starts with the Interim Order on the Conduct of Relations between the City of
New York and its Employees, July 21, 1954, as amended, March 14, 1955. This Interim Order
w~s somewhat further formalized by New York, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 38 (May 16, 1957).
Collective bargaining was firmly established by New York, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 49 (March
31, 1958) and implemented by Commissioner of Labor, Procedures for Joint Collective Bar-
gaining with the Director of the Budget and the Personnel Director under Executive Order
No. 49 (1960) in NEw YORK, N.Y., DEP'T OF LABOR & DEP'T OF PERSONNEL, EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONS PROGRAM 30 (1965). These "procedures" explicitly involved the Director of the Budget
as one of two officials with "joint authority and responsibility" concerning collective bargain-
ing with certified employee organizations as to the "terms and conditions of employment."
Id. at 30. New York, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 38 (Feb. 7, 1967) formalized the Office of Labor
Relations which had existed since August, 1966. Note, The Taylor Law, The OCB and the
Public Employee, 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 214, 226 (1969). The City policy favoring written
collective bargaining agreements was promulgated in 1967 in the New York City Collective
Bargaining Law, 6 NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 54, § 1173-2.0 (1971), and re-




among other things, established an Office of Labor Relations that
acted, in effect, as a mini-Bureau of the Budget."6 ' The shift of
budget management power to the Mayor by the 1963 Charter caused
a further reduction in the Bureau of the Budget's usual control.
Many expenditures, therefore, such as collective bargaining in-
creases, developed a certain "mandatory" quality; now, the Bureau
of the Budget's task is only to reshape the budget, in any way
possible, in order to accommodate the cost of these increases. The
collective bargaining-judgment fund gimmick is one way in which
the budget managers strive to make this accommodation.
Budget managers seem now to employ gimmickry in an attempt
to provide funding for appropriations over which they have rela-
tively little control rather than for the usual, historical reason of
enhancing their own power. These manipulative techniques provide
some provisional relief as the actual cost of these appropria-
tions-without sufficient funding to cover it-falls due.
Now, the abuses have become abused: the modification-
gimmickry machinery is just not sufficient to absorb these con-
stantly increasing expenses without disrupting the financial struc-
ture of the City. As a result, more and more oppressive, frightening
debt is pushed into a future which comes closer with each succeed-
ing budget.
C. Amendments to the Present Law
The Charter amendments, effective January 1, 1977, seemingly
seek to control this abusive gimmickry. Some of the new
amendment-changes might prove effective. The capital budget will
no longer be available to finance expense appropriations;262 the role
of the City legislature has been increased to provide some check on
261. New York, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 38 (Feb. 7, 1967) provided in pertinent part:
The Director of Labor Relations is authorized to negotiate labor agreements with the
unions certified as representing the various groups of City employees, and to prepare
and sign labor agreements on behalf of the Mayor.
This effectively eliminated the Bureau of the Budget from collective bargaining and con-
fronted it with large increases which are in effect mandatory. CENTRAL BUDGET ISSuEs, supra
note 112, at 66.
The fact that the Office of Labor Relations is a mini-Bureau of the Budget may be seen in
Program IV [1975-1976] EXECUTIVE BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK 8, showing, for 1974-
75, the Office of Management and Budget with 448 full time positions, and, at Program VI,
showing, for the same year, the Office of Labor Relations with 70 full time positions.
262. 1963 Charter § 211.1.a., as amended, (1975).
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the executive department," 3 and, crucial to that end, a budget
staff-the Legislative Office of Budget Review-will be appointed
to monitor and interpret the budget process for the City Council and
Board of Estimate.6 4
Certain amendment changes while appearing to be significant
are, in fact, illusory. For example, attempts to control collective
bargaining expenditures, ' while apparently sound, have within
them the elements of ineffectiveness: the agreements must be con-
cluded prior to the commencement of the fiscal year during which
their provisions shall be in effect "[s]o far as practicable";6 and,
"[n]o part of any retroactive wage or salary settlement shall be
charged to the capital budget" 26'-but what of the judgment and
claims fund? As such, these changes do not really assure any signifi-
cant increase in control over these agreements.
V. Final Analysis
A. Audit Check Controls
Audit check controls over the budget need rigorous improvement.
As unassuming as this conclusion may be, it is, nevertheless, starkly
263. Id. § 121.a., provides that the Mayor may not veto reductions or eliminations in the
executive budget. This, it is urged, makes the budget less executive because under the
present 1963 Charter § 121.b the budget may contain units of appropriation which a majority
of the City Council and Board of Estimate have rejected, but not by a veto-overriding major-
ity. Id. § 121.b., as amended, (1975) reduces the veto-override majority to two-thirds of all
Council members and a majority of the Board members, excluding the Mayor. Id. § 120.b
provides for adoption of single budget by both the Council and the Board, which prevents
mayoral whipsawing. Id. § 120.d. denies the Mayor a vote on the adoption of his executive
budget. The power granted in id. § 123.b., to either the Council or the Board to disapprove
proposed MA's which change a unit of appropriation by more than five per cent is clearly
illusory, in that it presupposes the units of appropriation have not been corrupted by gim-
mickry, see note 247 supra, and that they have been soundly devised in the first place, see
text accompanying note 128 supra.
264. 1963 Charter § 45, as amended, (1975). It is comparable to the Congressional Budget
Office, U.S.C. § 601-03 (1970), established July 12, 1954.
265. 1963 Charter § 1175, as amended, (1975) provides:
Not later than sixty days after the execution of a collective bargaining agreement, a
copy shall be published in the City Record together with a statement by the mayor
(1) of the total costs and current and future budgetary and economic consequences of
the agreement and (2) of the implications and likely impact of the agreement on the
efficient management of city agencies and the productivity of city employees.
This requires the Mayor to report a fait accompli and assumes that the City has the expertise
to cost the agreement.
266. Id. § 1176.a. (emphasis supplied).
267. Id. § 1176.b. See text accompanying notes 237-38 supra.
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valid. Special emphasis must be given to involving the City legisla-
ture in such controls.
Comprehensive legislation must yet be drafted which speaks to all
the budget practices in current use. This legislation must anticipate
the gimmickry, and then specifically and relentlessly prohibit it.
History shows that any ambiguity will provide the basis for circum-
venting the desired audit check control. The language in the present
Charter and the newly approved Charter amendments is not drawn
tightly enough, is not sufficiently detailed, to be effective: such
language has historically permitted gimmickry.
For example, as to the most notable failure of audit check con-
trols, if a Charter amendment is to prevent collective bargaining
agreements in excess of available revenues, it must provide: 1) that
for each agreement a grand total, bottom line figure be calculated,
which represents the total"' cost of that agreement. The City would
then be free to agree to any method of distribution of that total, so
long as that total was not exceeded; 2) that the City Council specifi-
cally approve each agreement; and 3) that at the time of approval,
the City Council be required to enact the additional taxation neces-
sary to provide revenues to finance fully each agreement. Anything
less detailed or less comprehensive would create the likelihood of
distortion of the actual costs and, subsequently, the disruption of
the budget through gimmick financing.
In addition, while the budget tends-and, perhaps, needs-to be
essentially a function of the executive department, the City legisla-
ture must be empowered and encouraged to hold budget managers
accountable. This needs to be done, not so much from the political
theory aspect of the need to maintain the balance of powers between
departments of government, but from the perspective of increasing
the kind and number of audit check controls and of ensuring an
efficient, responsive budget. To this end, the Office of Legislative
Budget Review can be instrumental.
A freshened dedication to audit checks can do much to prevent a
268. The suggestion here is that an overall dollar figure be agreed upon and that the
unions decide whether to take it in wages, pensions, or other fringe benefits. If a union
were to implement a plan that turned out to exceed the agreed cost, the union would make
up the difference, or wages, pension contributions or other "fringes" would be reduced until
the cost overrun had been recouped.
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runaway budget."9 But audit checks (including such devices as the
Emergency Financial Control Board,""0 and bankruptcy procedures)
cannot, history has demonstrated, insure an efficient, responsive
budget. For this we still need a program system.
B. A Program System
The Charter's program requirement, unfortunately, never has
been implemented. However, a program system can probably be
successful, if a new approach is used and certain traditional notions
are abandoned.
First, the program system must abandon the attempt to reduce
the budgetary consequences to a packet of "manageable," micro-
data. Creating an enormous micro-econometric system for the pur-
poses of output analysis and program evaluation results only in
overly complex, confusing, unrealistic formulations. In New York,
we do not very much need sophisticated indicators in order to deter-
mine goals-goals have been determined politically, and always will
be. New York needs instead a system which will help it to achieve
its goals, quickly and efficiently.
Second, for the same reasons we do not need to create an output
budget lexicon. Such lexicons can be deceiving as to the work ac-
tually being performed by employees, and if, as we have seen, the
outputs program is compromised, the lexicon is worse than ineffec-
tive.
What is needed is a cross-check program system which can be
easily cross-referenced with the line item budget. Then, the need for
subsidiary accounts would be obviated. The cross-check program
would use a budget lexicon which describes programs by traditional
functions that appear in most agencies, e.g.:
269. For a graph showing the recent growth of New York City's budget, see Appendix II.
270. The Municipal Assistance Corporation Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws chs. 168-69 (McKinney
Pamphlet, 1975), and the New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York,
N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 868 (McKinney Pamphlet, 1975) have caused a temporary displacement
of the City's regular budget process. The Financial Emergency Act creates an Emergency
Financial Control Board, id. § 5, empowered to develop a City budget known as a "financial
plan," id. § 8, and mandates that the City's Expense Budget be balanced in accordance with
the "accounting system and procedures prescribed in . . . the public authorities law ....
Id. § 8.1.a. See note 225 supra.
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Public Police Fire Parks
Library Department Department Department
Library
Program - $X $Y $Z
Function
Each program could then be independently evaluated as to its
performance in each agency. How much money is spent by the
Police Department on library function activities, and how many
persons are so employed? How efficient is the Fire Department at
maintaining its library system? Should the Parks Department
maintain its own reference materials, or should they be combined
with those of another agency?
The programming system arrayed above can supply answers to
questions such as these.
And, those questions which require qualitative evaluation to be
answered can have that evaluation made, not on the basis of ab-
stract mathematical formulas, but on the basis of human experi-
ence: each program could be supervised and inspected by a program
examiner, who would be responsible to the Bureau of the Budget.
The examiner would be chosen from an agency whose primary func-
tion (e.g. public library) roughly coincides with the program func-
tion, unless there is no agency whose primary function resembles the
program; in that case, the examiner would be chosen from a compa-
rable primary function in private industry. Presumably, the exam-
iner will know how to perform that function more expertly and
efficiently than those to whom it is merely a secondary activity.
Thus, traditional notions of agency inviolability, and the unalter-
able base, can be made more responsive to changing needs. The
superagency concept tried to supply this; those agencies tried to
dissolve traditional agency inviolability by subordinating several
traditional agencies to an administrative "overseer," which would
define goals of the superagency group, rather than defining separate
goals for each traditional agency. This was unsuccessful because it
did not deal with the inviolability of the unalterable base as it
existed within each traditional agency. The cross-reference program
approach would not directly attack traditional agency lines, but, by
analyzing program function in terms of traditional functions ap-
pearing in most agencies, would circumvent the usual agency insu-
larity. Now, when we consider how best to achieve a given goal we
1975]
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no longer need to limit the inquiry to how, say, the Police
Department (or the particular superagency) achieves that given
goal. The goal is, after all, a City goal, and all City agencies should,
to whatever extent they efficiently can, participate in achieving the
goal, regardless of their traditional orientation. To treat agencies of
the City with the inviolability of the great departments of govern-
ment is neither sound political theory, nor sound budget policy. It
is merely waste.
The cross-reference system allows the Budget makers to shift ap-
propriations, as a given function acquires a higher priority, accord-
ing to program function, as well as according to agency, (that is, as
well as according to primary function) thereby establishing a re-
markably responsive budget.
The City legislature, too, would benefit from this program sys-
tem. Cross-referencing the program array with the line item sup-
porting schedules would enable the legislature to make more in-
formed judgments as to what agencies, or parts of agencies, were
overstaffed or understaffed; waste and inefficiency (where to "trim
the fat") would be more easily ascertainable. And, the interested
public would find this program system comprehensible and mean-
ingful.
This program system need not be implemented with Euclidian
perfection in order to have any value; it does not need to be exhaus-
tive in the area of functions (a few can be missed) nor do the func-
tions need to be brilliantly designed. A few general programs could
be plotted first: library, electronic communications, recreation,
public safety. The list could be gradually expanded by both addi-
tion and division as the budget managers and analysts became fa-
miliar with the system.
It is quite clear that while audit check procedures may prevent
over-budgeting, they do not provide for budgetary efficiency or re-
sponsiveness. They don't eliminate waste, they balance it. So, the
essential goals of efficiency and responsiveness have never been
achieved in the history of public budgeting. The program system is
a way in which they can be achieved. A realistic program cross-
reference system which simplifies budget analysis must be adopted,
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APPENDIX I
._00 M AYQRALTY -
BUDGET FOR 1974-1975
MAJOR PROGRAM, PURPOSE AS MODIFIED
ACTIVITY OR INSTITUTION NO. OF RANGE SCHEDULE
POS. LINE AMT.
01 EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT 47 $ 1,045,256
02 EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE 62 829,152SERVICES
04 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT E BUDGET 452 8,541,523
05 YOUTH COUNSEL BUREAU 55 653,460
06 OFFICE OF LABOR RELATIONS 72 1.424,311.
07 NEW YOFK CITY COMMISSICN FOR 9 188,390
THE UN C THE CONSULAR CORPS
08 OFF OF LOWER MAN DEVELOPMENT 22 400,699
09 MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON THE 1 42,700
JUDICIARY
10 COMMITTFE ON CITY MARSH 20,700
It OFFICE OF MIDTOWN PLANNG t DEV 26 540,544
12 OFFICE OF JAMAICA DLNG C DEV 21 333,878
13 URBAN DESIGN COUNCIL 4 81,994
14 STATEN ISLAND DEVELOPMENT 7 120,823
15 OFFICE APPAREL IND P. DEV 9 180:895
16 OFFICE DOWNTOWN BROOKLYN DEV 15 331,163
17 EDUCATION TASK FORCE 20 279,078
19 EMPLOYEE SAL C WAGE AOJ ETC 304,432
20 EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS 4:86,000
21 OFFICE OF NE I GHBORHOOD SVCES 111 1,605,401
22 MAYORS OFFICE FOR VET ACTION 123 1,119,966
23 CIVIL DEFENSE & DISASTER CONTL 17 390,352
24 OFFICE FnR THE AGING 399 9,191t, 04
25 SURAV OF LABOR SERVICES 46 760,267
26 OFFICE OF THE HANDICAPPED 5 69:525
27 MAYORS OFFICE FOR VOLUNTEERS 8 120,I8O
28 OFFICE OF UPPER MANHATTAN 4 186,620
TOTAL DEPARTMENT 1535 $ 33,589,113
LESS-
04-73 APPROP IN CODE 05-02 DOSS WREP A 44,689
04-74 APPROPRIATED IN CODE 05-02 12,436
DOSS (WREPi
06-73 APP IN CODE 05-02-DOSS WREP 24, 565
06-74 APP IN CODE 05-02-DOSS WRAP 7,308
20-98 PAYABLE FR FOS APPRO IN MISC 4,846.000
24-70 APPROP IN CO 516 DOSS (WREP) 578,680
24-71 APPROP IN CO 516 DOSS (WREPI 15,000
24-73 APPROP IN CD 516-05-02 6,400
DOSS (WREP)
Z4-? APPROP IN CD 05-02 DOSS (WREPI 2,080
NET TOTAL DEPARTMENT 1535 $ 28,051,955
PERSONAL SERVICE S 18,901,634
OTHER THAN PERSONAL SERVICE 9,150,321
SOURCE OF FUNDS




FEDERAL AID 319 323
FEDERAL AID 24,072
FEDERAL FUNDS 4,962
FEDERAL AID 580, 3




PERSONAL SERVICE 47 S 941,756
OTHER THAN PERSONAL SERVICE 103,500
TOTAL EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT 47 $ 1,045,256
01-01 PERSONAL SERVICE
EXECUTIVE
1 MAYOR 1 60000 60,000
2 DEPUTY MAYOR 1 49849 49,849
3 ASSISTANT TO THE MAYOR 3 35725 107,175
4 DEPUTY MAYOR 2 45418 90,836
10 ASSOCIATE ASST CORPORATION I 1 1
COUNSELA GRADE 4
13-15 CLERK GRADE 5 2 19860-21850 41,710
18 CHAUFFEUR ATTENDANT I 108OO 10,800
19 MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR 2 9300-10685 21,370
20 RESEARCH PROJECTS COORDINATOR 1 26112 26,112
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